Showing posts with label Insurance Points. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Insurance Points. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 15, 2016

Raleigh Traffic Stop

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The Raleigh Police Department recently put out a video on what to do in a traffic stop.  Below is a great review of the video from the NC School of Government.

As mentioned in a recent News Roundup, the Raleigh Police Department (RPD) produced a short video entitled “Traffic Stops: What to Expect as a Motorist,” instructing drivers who have been pulled over by law enforcement on how they should behave. It appears that the RPD had the laudable goal of educating the public to ensure the safety of both officers and motorists. Captain Bruce, the officer who narrates the video, states that “by following a few basic steps, the experience can progress without misunderstanding or conflict.” The video is garnering attention: As of today, it has received 8,446 views on YouTube, with “likes” outweighing “dislikes” 21 to 15. This blog offers legal commentary on a few of the points made in the video, using a scale of green light for what appear to be sound instructions, yellow light for instructions that may raise questions, and red light for an instruction that may prove misleading to citizens.


Stoplight Green
Standard for a traffic stop: The officer in the video correctly states that a traffic stop must be supported “by reasonable suspicion based on facts the officer can articulate.” While there was a line of North Carolina cases holding that a stop for a readily observable traffic stop must be supported by probable cause, those cases have been overruled. See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412 (2008). The stop depicted in the video is based on failure to stop at a stop sign, an infraction. G.S. 20-158(b)(1). The officer was justified in making the stop; I didn’t even see the car’s brake lights come on as the driver rolled through the stop sign and made a right turn. An officer might choose to give a warning rather than a citation as no cars or people were around and the driving wasn’t particularly risky, but the decision is up to the officer.
Stoplight YellowThe duty to answer the stopping officer’s questions: The officer tells viewers, “Answer any questions the officer may have fully and clearly.” This directive gives me pause. Under North Carolina law, a person operating a motor vehicle must identify himself or herself when requested by an officer (or, for that matter, when requested by any other person in the event of an accident). G.S. 20-29. Unlike some other states, North Carolina has not enacted “stop and identify” statutes when a person is not operating a motor vehicle. See In re D.B., 214 N.C. App. 489, 495 (2011). However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that the failure to identify oneself during a lawful stop can constitute resisting an officer when it hinders the officer in issuing a citation or otherwise completing the stop. State v. Friend, ___ N.C. App. ___, 768 S.E.2d 146, 148 (2014) (trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer where the defendant, a passenger, refused to provide the officer with his identification so that the officer could issue a citation for a seatbelt violation). The court recognized that Fifth Amendment protections may justify a refusal to provide one’s identity in some circumstances, but didn’t provide examples. Id.
Beyond identifying oneself and providing license and registration, the law does not require a motorist to answer questions. While a driver may want to answer an officer’s questions to expedite the stop, he or she has the right to remain silent. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Further, if the officer’s questions are unrelated to the purpose of the stop, prolong it, and are not supported by reasonable suspicion of a crime, they may violate the 4th amendment. Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015); see also U.S. v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757 (4th Cir. 2010) (police questioning may exceed the permissible scope of the stop where officer abandons prosecution of traffic stop and embarks on another course of investigation). For example, an officer may not extend a routine traffic stop to ask questions about drug activity.
Generally, Miranda protections don’t apply to questioning of a motorist during a routine traffic stop because the motorist isn’t in custody. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). However, Miranda warnings are required if the officer arrests the driver or takes actions that constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest.
Stoplight RedConsent searches: In the video, after the infraction has been addressed and the traffic stop completed, the officer seeks consent to extend the interaction: “Sir, at this point, you’re free to leave, but what I’d like to do with your permission is just have you step to the rear of your car and just talk with you for a few more minutes.” The driver is agreeable: “OK, sure, that’s no problem.” The officer then asks for permission to pat down the driver’s clothing and search his car.
As the video only depicts consent searches that take place after the stop has ended, there is no discussion of the legal justification that is required to support a frisk of an occupant or search of a car before a stop has ended, or the constitutional limitations on extending a stop and continuing to detain a person once the purpose of the stop has been completed, described in this recent post. See also Jeff Welty, Traffic Stops (2015); 1 North Carolina Defender Manual Ch. 15 (Stops and Warrantless Searches) (2d ed. 2013). In addition, while the narrator states that a motorist has the right to permit or refuse a vehicle search, the action suggests the right thing to do is consent; after all, this is a video demonstrating steps that motorists should follow in order to stay safe, as the narrator indicated at the outset.
As we describe in the manual Raising Issues of Race in North Carolina Criminal Cases (in section 2.7C), consent searches during traffic stops have become increasingly commonplace and officers have broad discretion in deciding who to ask for such consent. Concerns about misuse of this discretion for racial profiling have prompted some states to pass legislation banning the use of consent searches. See The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked Function of the Consent Search Doctrine, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2187, 2187–88 (2006). Questions have been raised about whether motorists actually believe they can decline an officer’s request to consent; some citizens who are confronted with an armed, uniformed officer may feel that submission is compulsory. In North Carolina, to ensure that motorists understand they have the right to decline, some police departments now have a policy that officers must obtain a driver’s signature on a consent form when seeking consent to search. In October 2014, Durham became the second city in the state (following Fayetteville) to adopt a written consent form policy. For data about the impact of this change, see Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, and Kelsey Shoub, Summary of Durham Stops and Searches Before and After Written Consent Policy Reform of October 1, 2014 at p. 4 (2015) (finding that consent searches declined substantially in the first six months after the policy went into effect; however, a corresponding increase occurred in probable cause searches, resulting in no change in search rates during traffic stops overall).
To name the elephant in the reel, the video portrays an African American man being stopped for a minor traffic offense who behaves in a courteous and cooperative manner throughout the encounter. Nonetheless, a backup unit is called, he is asked to get out of his car, he is subjected to a pat down, and he is instructed to sit on the curb with his legs extended and his hands on his knees while his car is searched. Giving the RPD the benefit of the doubt, the action may unfold in this way because the Department wanted to show the range of police actions that may follow a traffic stop. Nonetheless, this dramatization merits a red light to stop and consider the issues, especially in light of data from approximately 13 million North Carolina traffic stops indicating that, compared to White motorists, Black and Latino motorists and passengers are almost twice as likely to be searched following a traffic stop. See Frank R. Baumgartner & Derek Epp, North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics Analysis: Final Report to the North Carolina Advocates for Justice Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Bias at p. 5 (2012).
Stoplight GreenContacting Internal Affairs: The video ends by encouraging members of the community to contact the RPD Internal Affairs Unit (led by the narrator Captain Bruce) with any complaints about discourteous or inappropriate conduct by officers, and it provides contact information. This is an important public service announcement as many citizens may believe that they have no recourse when an officer fails to follow the law and departmental policies. Results of internal affairs investigations may be discoverable in some cases and may help determine whether a particular officer has selectively enforced the law, e.g., in deciding which motorists to stop or search. See Raising Issues of Race § 2.3D (discussing this issue). I therefore end by giving a green light to the RPD for “taking the Police Department’s integrity and [the Internal Affairs Unit’s] role in helping to preserve it seriously.”

Monday, August 24, 2015

Failure to Stop for Stopped School Bus

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Every year when school starts, I like to remind everyone about the laws for stopping for a stopped school bus.  Failure to do so is a class 1 misdemeanor.  No PJC.  Five license points, 4 insurance points.  Here is more.

N.C. Department of Transportation
Division of Motor Vehicles
School Bus & Traffic Safety Section

1100 New Bern Avenue
Raleigh, NC 27697-0001
phone: (919) 861-3109
fax: (919) 715-3306

Original brochure designed and produced by the North Carolina Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, School Bus & Traffic Safety Section
For a copy of this brochure,
call (919) 861-3109.

North Carolina School Bus Stop Law

STOP...It's the Law
(poster & placard)

Download the North Carolina School Bus Stop Law Rack Card
Report of violation of School Bus Law (G. S. 20-2 17) or
 
§ 20-217.  Motor vehicles to stop for properly marked and designated school buses in certain instances; evidence of identity of driver.
(a)        When a school bus is displaying its mechanical stop signal or flashing red lights and the bus is stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging passengers, the driver of any other vehicle that approaches the school bus from any direction on the same street, highway, or public vehicular area shall bring that other vehicle to a full stop and shall remain stopped. The driver of the other vehicle shall not proceed to move, pass, or attempt to pass the school bus until after the mechanical stop signal has been withdrawn, the flashing red stoplights have been turned off, and the bus has started to move.
(b)        For the purpose of this section, a school bus includes a public school bus transporting children or school personnel, a public school bus transporting senior citizens under G.S. 115C-243, or a privately owned bus transporting children. This section applies only in the event the school bus bears upon the front and rear a plainly visible sign containing the words "school bus."
(c)        Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the driver of a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction from the school bus, upon any road, highway or city street that has been divided into two roadways, so constructed as to separate vehicular traffic between the two roadways by an intervening space (including a center lane for left turns if the roadway consists of at least four more lanes) or by a physical barrier, need not stop upon meeting and passing any school bus that has stopped in the roadway across the dividing space or physical barrier.
(d)        It shall be unlawful for any school bus driver to stop and receive or discharge passengers or for any principal or superintendent of any school, routing a school bus, to authorize the driver of any school bus to stop and receive or discharge passengers upon any roadway described by subsection (c) of this section where passengers would be required to cross the roadway to reach their destination or to board the bus; provided, that passengers may be discharged or received at points where pedestrians and vehicular traffic are controlled by adequate stop-and-go traffic signals.
(e)        Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, any person violating this section shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor and shall pay a minimum fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00). A person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall not receive a prayer for judgment continued under any circumstances.
(f)         Expired.
(g)        Any person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section and strikes any person shall be guilty of a Class I felony and shall pay a minimum fine of one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250). Any person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section and strikes any person, resulting in the death of that person, shall be guilty of a Class H felony and shall pay a minimum fine of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
(g1)      The Division shall revoke, for a period of one year, the drivers license of a person convicted of a second misdemeanor violation under this section within a three-year period. The Division shall revoke, for a period of two years, the drivers license of a person convicted of a Class I felony violation under this section. The Division shall revoke, for a period of three years, the drivers license of a person convicted of a Class H felony violation under this section. The Division shall permanently revoke the drivers license of (i) a person convicted of a second felony violation under this section within any period of time and (ii) a person convicted of a third misdemeanor violation under this section within any period of time.
In the case of a first felony conviction under this section, the licensee may apply to the sentencing court for a limited driving privilege after a period of six months of revocation, provided the person's drivers license has not also been revoked or suspended under any other provision of law. A limited driving privilege issued under this subsection shall be valid for the period of revocation remaining in the same manner and under the terms and conditions prescribed in G.S. 20-16.1(b). If the person's drivers license is revoked or suspended under any other statute, the limited driving privilege issued pursuant to this subsection is invalid.
In the case of a permanent revocation of a person's drivers license for committing a third misdemeanor violation under this section within any period of time, the person may apply for a drivers license after two years. The Division may, with or without a hearing, issue a new drivers license upon satisfactory proof that the former licensee has not been convicted of a moving violation under this Chapter or the laws of another state. The Division may impose any restrictions or conditions on the new drivers license that the Division considers appropriate. Any conditions or restrictions imposed by the Division shall not exceed two years.
In the case of a permanent revocation of a person's drivers license for committing a second Class I felony violation under this section within any period of time, the person may apply for a drivers license after three years. The Division may, with or without a hearing, issue a new drivers license upon satisfactory proof that the former licensee has not been convicted of a moving violation under this Chapter or the laws of another state. The Division may impose any restrictions or conditions on the new drivers license that the Division considers appropriate. Any conditions or restrictions imposed by the Division shall not exceed three years.
Any person whose drivers license is revoked under this section is disqualified pursuant to G.S. 20-17.4 from driving a commercial motor vehicle for the period of time in which the person's drivers license remains revoked under this section.
(g2)      Pursuant to G.S. 20-54, failure of a person to pay any fine or costs imposed pursuant to this section shall result in the Division withholding the registration renewal of a motor vehicle registered in that person's name. The clerk of superior court in the county in which the case was disposed shall notify the Division of any person who fails to pay a fine or costs imposed pursuant to this section within 20 days of the date specified in the court's judgment, as required by G.S. 20-24.2(a)(2). The Division shall continue to withhold the registration renewal of a motor vehicle until the clerk of superior court notifies the Division that the person has satisfied the conditions of G.S. 20-24.1(b) applicable to the person's case. The provisions of this subsection shall be in addition to any other actions the Division may take to enforce the payment of any fine imposed pursuant to this section.
(h)        Automated camera and video recording systems may be used to detect and prosecute violations of this section. Any photograph or video recorded by a camera or video recording system shall, if consistent with the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, be admissible as evidence in any proceeding alleging a violation of subsection (a) of this section.  (1925, c. 265; 1943, c. 767; 1947, c. 527; 1955, c. 1365; 1959, c. 909; 1965, c. 370; 1969, c. 952; 1971, c. 245, s. 1; 1973, c. 1330, s. 35; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1280, s. 4; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1323; 1983, c. 779, s. 1; 1985, c. 700, s. 1; 1991, c. 290, s. 1; 1993, c. 539, s. 382; 1994, Ex. Sess., c. 24, s. 14(c); 1998-149, s. 10; 2005-204, s. 1; 2006-160, s. 1; 2006-259, s. 11(a); 2007-382, s. 1; 2009-147, ss. 1, 2; 2013-293, s. 2.)



Monday, April 27, 2015

North Carolina Speeding in a Work Zone

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The North Carolina State Legislature is looking at the laws for Speeding in a Work Zone and whether the law should apply when there are no workers.  The current law applies 24 hours a day regardless if there are workers present or not.
Below is the article from the News and Observer on the new proposal.

Drivers would be spared the state's $250 penalty for speeding through highway work zones in cases where no construction workers were present at the time, under legislation moving quickly through the House. The House Transportation Committee approved the bill Wednesday after emotional debate that featured the obituary of a state Department of Transportation worker who was killed March 23 in a Goldsboro work zone crash. "I find it morally wrong to jeopardize their safety as they put their lives in harm's way to make the roads safer for us," said Rep. Dean Arp, a Union County Republican, after handing out copies of the obituary for William Grey Bailey, 35, of Kenly. "The increased penalty for speeding through a work zone is an effective deterrent." But the bill's sponsor, Rep. Sarah Stevens, didn't back down. She said the driver responsible for Bailey's death was impaired and would be punished for more serious offenses. Stevens, a Surry County Republican, said her bill would not change the reduced speed limits posted to make drivers slow down in work zones. "It just says if workers are not present, we should not assess a $250 penalty," she said. "The problem still occurs in my county, where they've got a speed trap set up in this work zone where there's no work going on." Rep. Larry Yarborough, a Person County Republican, agreed. "Half the drivers are not slowing down because they see there's no construction going on and no reason to go slower," Yarborough said.
Arp said DOT reduces the speed limit and posts signs warning of $250 tickets for violators only at a small fraction of work sites. He said the department had 734 active work zones across the state at the first of April, but only 30 where the $250 speeding penalty was applied. Rep. Jay Adams, a Catawba County Republican, said work zone restrictions were also intended to protect drivers from construction-related hazards. The committee approved Stevens' bill on a split vote and sent it for further consideration to a judiciary committee chaired by Stevens.
Also Wednesday, the House Transportation Committee endorsed a bill to eliminate tolls on all state ferries. DOT collects tolls on three of its seven ferry routes. The House and Senate have tussled over ferry tolls for several years. A Senate push to require tolls on all seven routes prevailed a few years ago, but Gov. Bev Perdue blocked its implementation and legislative leaders did not force the issue.(Bruce Siceloff, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, 4/23/15).

Monday, April 20, 2015

DWi and gun possession

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Below is a great article on the effects of a DWI in NC to your ability to possess a fire arm.  As always, thanks to Shea Denning at the school of government.

The maximum punishment for driving while impaired in violation of G.S. 20-138.1 increased from two to three years in 2011. As a result, defendants convicted of misdemeanor DWI and sentenced at the most serious level—Aggravated Level One—are prohibited from possessing firearms by federal law. That’s because federal law prohibits firearm possession by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, though state law misdemeanors that are punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less are excluded from this category of disqualifying convictions. Because North Carolina law sets out a single offense of driving while impaired, which may be punished at varying levels, rather than six separate offenses, there is a question as to whether any defendant convicted of misdemeanor DWI on or after December 1, 2011 may lawfully possess a firearm, regardless of the level at which the defendant was actually punished.

Federal gun law. The federal law colloquially referred to as the felon-in-possession statute is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  See Schrader v. Holder, 831 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (D.D.C. 2011) aff’d, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013). That label is a misnomer, however, as misdemeanor convictions punishable by more than two years imprisonment under state law also disqualify a person from possessing a firearm. Id. Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm. Another provision, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), defines “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to exclude “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” Thus, for defendants convicted of misdemeanors under state law, the question of whether they are disqualified from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) is determined by whether the misdemeanor for which they were convicted carried a maximum punishment of more than two years. If so, the person is disqualified.  (A separate provision of federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), prohibits firearm possession by a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. That provision is not tied to a determination of the maximum punishment that could have been imposed for the crime, and is not discussed herein.)
State DWI law. G.S. 20-138.1 proscribes the conduct known as DWI in North Carolina.  A person who (1) drives (2) a vehicle (3) on a street, highway, or public vehicular area within the State, (4) while under the influence of an impairing substance commits the offense of misdemeanor DWI.  The person’s relative culpability is sorted out at sentencing, based largely on whether the person (1) had other DWI convictions within the previous seven years; (2) had a license that was already revoked for DWI; (3) seriously injured another person; and/or (4) had a child or disabled person in the vehicle when he or she drove. See G.S. 20-179(c). In superior court, the State must notify the defendant in writing and before trial of its intention to prove any aggravating factor, including the four grossly aggravating factors previously mentioned.  The existence of one or more grossly aggravating factors increases the potential punishment a defendant faces.  If three or more grossly aggravating factors are found, the defendant is punished at Aggravated Level One, and may receive up to three years’ imprisonment. If two grossly aggravating factors are found, the defendant is punished at Level One, and may receive up to two years’ imprisonment.  Levels Two through Five carry lesser maximum punishments.
Because G.S. 20-179 effectively requires a prosecutor in superior court to plead applicable aggravating factors, and requires that such factors, other than the fact of a prior conviction, be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, questions regarding whether G.S. 20-138.1 and G.S. 20-179 define one or six offenses are, in most circumstances, academic.  The federal felon-in-possession law is, however, an exception.  If there are six separate DWI offenses, then only a DWI conviction punished at Aggravated Level One disqualifies a defendant from possessing a firearm.  If there is but one crime of DWI that carries a maximum punishment of three years, then any conviction for a DWI committed December 1, 2011 or later might be viewed as disqualifying 
disqualifiesa defendant from possessing a firearm. See Binderup v. Holder, 2014 WL 4764424 (E.D.Pa. Sept 25, 2014) (unpublished op.) (“The cases discussed above demonstrate that the phrase “punishable by”, as utilized in § 921(a)(20) and § 922(g)(1), concerns the maximum . .  potential . . . term of imprisonment applicable to a particular prior state-law conviction.”).
It seems to me that there are reasonable arguments to be made both ways.
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), of whether convictions under the State’s structured sentencing laws qualify as offenses “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,” tends to support the view that only a defendant punished at Aggravated Level One is disqualified under § 922(g)(1). The Simmons court concluded that the defendant’s conviction for a Class I felony offense for which he could not have received a sentence exceeding eight months’ community punishment given his lack of criminal history was not a conviction for an offense punishable by imprisonment for term exceeding one year, even though a defendant with a certain number of prior criminal convictions could have received a sentence exceeding twelve months’ imprisonment. The court explained that the “mere possibility that Simmons’s conduct, coupled with facts outside the record of conviction, could have authorized a conviction of a crime punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment cannot and does not demonstrate that Simmons was actually convicted of such a crime.”  Id. at 244 (internal quotations omitted). The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Carter, 471 Fed. Appx. 136 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished op.), applied Simmons in determining that a defendant’s prior convictions for drug offense classified as felonies under North Carolina’s structured sentencing regime were not offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year for purposes of the federal felon-in-possession statute. 
Simmons relied upon the fact that the State had to prove the existence of aggravating factors sufficient to warrant the imposition of an aggravated sentence under the Structured Sentencing Act.  That also is true under the sentencing scheme set forth in G.S. 20-179 for DWI.
May the federal government categorically ban persons convicted of DWI from possessing a firearm?
The right to bear arms. The United States Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), held that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, including self-defense within the home.  In recognizing an individual right to keep and bear arms, however, the court was careful to note that it did not intend to “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” as well as other long-enshrined restrictions.  See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality op.) (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,’ . . . . We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation [of the Second Amendment by the Fourteenth Amendment] does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”). Courts considering post-Heller challenges to § 922(g)(1) have relied upon this commentary in upholding the provision as constitutional.
Are misdemeanants different? The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013), considered plaintiffs’ challenge to his disqualification under § 922(g)(1) based on a decades-old conviction of a common law misdemeanor.  The Schrader court determined that even assuming that common-law misdemeanants fell within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection, the firearms ban imposed upon this class of individuals was constitutional.  The court applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny since “common-law misdemeanants as a class cannot be considered law abiding and responsible.” Id. at 989.  Thus, the government was required to demonstrate that disarming common-law misdemeanants is substantially related to an important governmental objective.  Schrader held that the government met this test.  The statute’s overarching objective is prevention of armed violence, which is of obvious importance.  The firearms ban in § 922(g)(1) is reasonably designed to accomplish that objective as it keeps guns away from people suspected of more serious crimes—people who might be expected to misuse such weapons. While some common-law misdemeanants may pose no such risk, Schrader noted that “Congress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been shown to be untrustworthy with weapons.” Id. at 991 (internal citations omitted).
As-applied challenges might succeed. The Schrader court noted that Heller might dictate a different outcome had the plaintiffs raised an as-applied challenge. Schrader himself was disqualified based on a misdemeanor conviction for assault and battery that occurred forty years before he sought to purchase a gun.  The offense involved only a fistfight.  Schrader received no jail time, served honorably in Vietnam, and, except for a single traffic violation, had no arrests or convictions in the years that followed.  The court declined to consider such a challenge, however, as it had not been argued below.


Tuesday, April 7, 2015

Can Law Enforcement Use Drones to Issue Traffic Tickets in North Carolina

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The current answer is no.  However, there are efforts being made by law enforcement and the State to change that.  Real the article below to see the steps that need to be taken before that can be done.

As always, thanks to the great legal minds at the North Carolina School of Government.

Drones are remote-controlled aircraft. They can be equipped with cameras, and may be useful for surveillance. Does the use of drones by law enforcement officers raise any legal concerns?
The short answer is yes, in at least four ways.
Federal approval required. First, it appears that before any governmental entity may use drones, the entity must obtain a Certificate of Authorization from the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA describes the COA process briefly here. However, failure to obtain FAA approval likely would not require the suppression of any evidence, such as video footage, obtained by an unauthorized drone. Violations of federal statutes and regulations don’t normally require suppression, so long as the violations are not also constitutional violations. (Constitutional violations are discussed below.)
State CIO approval required. Second, before any governmental entity in North Carolina may use drones, the entity must obtain approval from the State CIO. This requirement is the result of several legislative enactments:
  • Section 7.16 of the 2013 appropriations bill, L. 2013-360, provides that “[u]ntil July 1, 2015, no State or local governmental entity or officer may procure or operate and unmanned aircraft system . . . unless the State CIO approves.”
  • Section 7.11 of the 2014 appropriations bill, L. 2014-100, extends the ban on unapproved governmental use of drones through December 31, 2015.

Would a violation of this requirement necessitate the suppression of any evidence obtained thereby? Maybe. Although the statutory exclusionary rule in G.S. 15A-928 applies only to violations of Chapter 15A, the appellate courts have sometimes suppressed evidence as a sanction for other statutory violations by state actors, as Shea noted here in connection with a violation of Chapter 20.
Compliance with new drone statute required. Third, section 34.30 of the 2014 appropriations bill, S.L. 2014-100, enacted new Article 16B of Chapter 15A. That article generally prohibits the use of drones to conduct surveillance of “[p]rivate real property,” “[a] person,” or “a dwelling occupied by a person and that dwelling’s curtilage” without consent. But it contains exceptions allowing law enforcement to conduct drone surveillance with a warrant, or without a warrant when there is a high risk of a terrorist attack; when the surveillance involves an area that is in an officer’s plain view; or when exigent circumstances exist. It also allows law enforcement “[t]o photograph gatherings to which the general public is invited on public or private land.”
The statute contains an exclusionary rule and provides for a civil cause of action against violators. The appropriations bill also enacted new Article 10 of Chapter 63, requiring public drone operators to be trained and licensed.
The statute doesn’t define “surveillance,” which has led some to criticize the statute for vagueness. The exception allowing law enforcement officers to photograph public gatherings on private property has also been controversial.
Compliance with the Fourth Amendment required. Fourth, any law enforcement activity involving drones must comply with the Fourth Amendment. However, it is far from clear how the Fourth Amendment applies to drones. Will they be governed by the precedents concerning aircraft flyovers, like California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), which generally allow considerable leeway to law enforcement? Does the increasing prevalence of hobbyists’ drones mean that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy from drones? Or does the existence of inexpensive drones present a novel Fourth Amendment concern that will require a novel doctrine to address it, as the Supreme Court arguably charted new courses regarding GPS tracking in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __ (2012), and regarding cell phone searches incident to arrest in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __ (2014)? There are not many court decisions in this area, but there are plenty of law review articles, including Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones Continues to Erode Our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 U. Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 1 (2013); Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 72 (2013); Andrew B. Talai, Comment, Drones and Jones: The Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 729 (2014); and Matthew R. Koerner, Comment, Drones and the Fourth Amendment: Redefining Expectations of Privacy, 64 Duke L.J. 1129 (2015).
Other possible issues. In certain cases, drone use might implicate other legal concerns. For example, the use of a drone to make audio recordings of otherwise private conversations might run afoul of the electronic surveillance statute, G.S. 15A-287.
Concluding thoughts. As far as I know, law enforcement agencies in North Carolina aren’t using drones now. Recall that State CIO approval is required to use drones prior to December 31, 2015. In March 2014, the State CIO issued a report and made a presentation on drone use to a legislative committee. The presentation stated that NC State’s Next Generation Air Transport project was the only governmental entity approved to use drones at that time. (Of course, some agencies might have sought approval since that time.) A few agencies apparently own drones, presumably purchased before the 2013 moratorium took effect, as reported in this Independent Weekly story. Perhaps agencies are waiting for the legal landscape to settle. The General assembly is considering more changes to the drone laws this session, including House Bill 4, which appears to me to be technical in nature, and Senate Bill 622, which would remove the exemption that allows law enforcement surveillance of gatherings to which the general public is invited on private land. In the long run, though, the use of drones by law enforcement is likely inevitable.

Monday, March 30, 2015

DWI VEHICLE SEISURE

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www.kisslinglaw.com

If you are charged with DWI and your license is revoked or you have no insurance, your car can be impounded and sold by the state.  The procedure is very specific as can be seen in the statute below.  If you are in this situation, you should contact an attorney immediately.


§ 20-28.3.  Seizure, impoundment, forfeiture of motor vehicles for offenses involving impaired driving while license revoked or without license and insurance, and for felony speeding to elude arrest.
(a)        Motor Vehicles Subject to Seizure for Impaired Driving Offenses. -
A motor vehicle that is driven by a person who is charged with an offense involving impaired driving is subject to seizure if:
(1)        At the time of the violation, the drivers license of the person driving the motor vehicle was revoked as a result of a prior impaired driving license revocation as defined in G.S. 20-28.2(a); or
(2)        At the time of the violation:
a.         The person was driving without a valid drivers license, and
b.         The driver was not covered by an automobile liability policy.
For the purposes of this subsection, a person who has a complete defense, pursuant to G.S. 20-35, to a charge of driving without a drivers license, shall be considered to have had a valid drivers license at the time of the violation.
(a1)      Motor Vehicles Subject to Seizure for Felony Speeding to Elude Arrest. - A motor vehicle is subject to seizure if it is driven by a person who is charged with the offense of felony speeding to elude arrest pursuant to G.S. 20-141.5(b) or (b1).
(b)        Duty of Officer. - If the charging officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by the defendant may be subject to forfeiture under this section, the officer shall seize the motor vehicle and have it impounded. If the officer determines prior to seizure that the motor vehicle had been reported stolen, the officer shall not seize the motor vehicle pursuant to this section. If the officer determines prior to seizure that the motor vehicle was a rental vehicle driven by a person not listed as an authorized driver on the rental contract, the officer shall not seize the motor vehicle pursuant to this section, but shall make a reasonable effort to notify the owner of the rental vehicle that the vehicle was stopped and that the driver of the vehicle was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental contract. Probable cause may be based on the officer's personal knowledge, reliable information conveyed by another officer, records of the Division, or other reliable sources. The seizing officer shall notify the Division as soon as practical but no later than 24 hours after seizure of the motor vehicle of the seizure in accordance with procedures established by the Division.
(b1)      Written Notification of Impoundment. - Within 48 hours of receipt within regular business hours of the notice of seizure, the Division shall issue written notification of impoundment to any lienholder of record and to any motor vehicle owner who was not operating the motor vehicle at the time of the offense. A notice of seizure received outside regular business hours shall be considered to have been received at the start of the next business day. The notification of impoundment shall be sent by first-class mail to the most recent address contained in the Division's records. If the motor vehicle is registered in another state, notice shall be sent to the address shown on the records of the state where the motor vehicle is registered. This written notification shall provide notice that the motor vehicle has been seized, state the reason for the seizure and the procedure for requesting release of the motor vehicle. Additionally, if the motor vehicle was damaged while the operator was committing an offense resulting in seizure or incident to the seizure, the Division shall issue written notification of the seizure to the owner's insurance company of record and to any other insurance companies that may be insuring other motor vehicles involved in the accident. The Division shall prohibit title to a seized motor vehicle from being transferred by a motor vehicle owner unless authorized by court order.
(b2)      Additional Notification to Lienholders. - In addition to providing written notification pursuant to subsection (b1) of this section, within eight hours of receipt within regular business hours of the notice of seizure, the Division shall notify by facsimile any lienholder of record that has provided the Division with a designated facsimile number for notification of impoundment. The facsimile notification of impoundment shall state that the vehicle has been seized, state the reason for the seizure, and notify the lienholder of the additional written notification that will be provided pursuant to subsection (b1) of this section. The Division shall establish procedures to allow a lienholder to provide one designated facsimile number for notification of impoundment for any vehicle for which the lienholder is a lienholder of record and shall maintain a centralized database of the provided facsimile numbers. The lienholder must provide a facsimile number at which the Division may give notification of impoundment at anytime.
(c)        Review by Magistrate. - Upon determining that there is probable cause for seizing a motor vehicle, the seizing officer shall present to a magistrate within the county where the driver was charged an affidavit of impoundment setting forth the basis upon which the motor vehicle has been or will be seized for forfeiture. The magistrate shall review the affidavit of impoundment and if the magistrate determines the requirements of this section have been met, shall order the motor vehicle held. The magistrate may request additional information and may hear from the defendant if the defendant is present. If the magistrate determines the requirements of this section have not been met, the magistrate shall order the motor vehicle released to a motor vehicle owner upon payment of towing and storage fees. If the motor vehicle has not yet been seized, and the magistrate determines that seizure is appropriate, the magistrate shall issue an order of seizure of the motor vehicle. The magistrate shall provide a copy of the order of seizure to the clerk of court. The clerk shall provide copies of the order of seizure to the district attorney and the attorney for the county board of education.
(c1)      Effecting an Order of Seizure. - An order of seizure shall be valid anywhere in the State. Any officer with territorial jurisdiction and who has subject matter jurisdiction for violations of this Chapter may use such force as may be reasonable to seize the motor vehicle and to enter upon the property of the defendant to accomplish the seizure. An officer who has probable cause to believe the motor vehicle is concealed or stored on private property of a person other than the defendant may obtain a search warrant to enter upon that property for the purpose of seizing the motor vehicle.
(d)        Custody of Motor Vehicle. - Unless the motor vehicle is towed pursuant to a statewide or regional contract, or a contract with the county board of education, the seized motor vehicle shall be towed by a commercial towing company designated by the law enforcement agency that seized the motor vehicle. Seized motor vehicles not towed pursuant to a statewide or regional contract or a contract with a county board of education shall be retrieved from the commercial towing company within a reasonable time, not to exceed 10 days, by the county board of education or their agent who must pay towing and storage fees to the commercial towing company when the motor vehicle is retrieved. If either a statewide or regional contractor, or the county board of education, chooses to contract for local towing services, all towing companies on the towing list for each law enforcement agency with jurisdiction within the county shall be given written notice and an opportunity to submit proposals prior to a contract for local towing services being awarded. The seized motor vehicle is under the constructive possession of the county board of education for the county in which the operator of the vehicle is charged at the time the vehicle is delivered to a location designated by the county board of education or delivered to its agent pending release or sale, or in the event a statewide or regional contract is in place, under the constructive possession of the Department of Public Instruction, on behalf of the State at the time the vehicle is delivered to a location designated by the Department of Public Instruction or delivered to its agent pending release or sale. Absent a statewide or regional contract that provides otherwise, each county board of education may elect to have seized motor vehicles stored on property owned or leased by the county board of education and charge a reasonable fee for storage, not to exceed ten dollars ($10.00) per day. In the alternative, the county board of education may contract with a commercial towing and storage facility or other private entity for the towing, storage, and disposal of seized motor vehicles, and a storage fee of not more than ten dollars ($10.00) per day may be charged. Except for gross negligence or intentional misconduct, the county board of education, or any of its employees, shall not be liable to the owner or lienholder for damage to or loss of the motor vehicle or its contents, or to the owner of personal property in a seized vehicle, during the time the motor vehicle is being towed or stored pursuant to this subsection.
(e)        Release of Motor Vehicle Pending Trial. - A motor vehicle owner, other than the driver at the time of the underlying offense resulting in the seizure, may apply to the clerk of superior court in the county where the charges are pending for pretrial release of the motor vehicle.
The clerk shall release the motor vehicle to a nondefendant motor vehicle owner conditioned upon payment of all towing and storage charges incurred as a result of seizure and impoundment of the motor vehicle under the following conditions:
(1)        The motor vehicle has been seized for not less than 24 hours;
(2)        Repealed by Session Laws 1998-182, s. 3, effective December 1, 1998.
(3)        A bond in an amount equal to the fair market value of the motor vehicle as defined by G.S. 20-28.2 has been executed and is secured by a cash deposit in the full amount of the bond, by a recordable deed of trust to real property in the full amount of the bond, by a bail bond under G.S. 58-71-1(2), or by at least one solvent surety, payable to the county school fund and conditioned on return of the motor vehicle, in substantially the same condition as it was at the time of seizure and without any new or additional liens or encumbrances, on the day of any hearing scheduled and noticed by the district attorney under G.S. 20-28.2(c), unless the motor vehicle has been permanently released;
(4)        Execution of either:
a.         An impaired driving acknowledgment as described in G.S. 20-28.2(a1)(1a) if the seizure was for an offense involving impaired driving; or
b.         A speeding to elude arrest acknowledgment as defined in G.S. 20-28.2(a1)(8) if the seizure was for violation of G.S. 20-141.5(b) or (b1).
(5)        A check of the records of the Division indicates that the requesting motor vehicle owner has not previously executed an acknowledgment naming the operator of the seized motor vehicle; and
(6)        A bond posted to secure the release of this motor vehicle under this subsection has not been previously ordered forfeited under G.S. 20-28.5.
In the event a nondefendant motor vehicle owner who obtains temporary possession of a seized motor vehicle pursuant to this subsection does not return the motor vehicle on the day of the forfeiture hearing as noticed by the district attorney under G.S. 20-28.2(c) or otherwise violates a condition of pretrial release of the seized motor vehicle as set forth in this subsection, the bond posted shall be ordered forfeited and an order of seizure shall be issued by the court. Additionally, a nondefendant motor vehicle owner or lienholder who willfully violates any condition of pretrial release may be held in civil or criminal contempt.
(e1)      Pretrial Release of Motor Vehicle to Innocent Owner. - A nondefendant motor vehicle owner may file a petition with the clerk of court seeking a pretrial determination that the petitioner is an innocent owner. The clerk shall consider the petition and make a determination as soon as may be feasible. At any proceeding conducted pursuant to this subsection, the clerk is not required to determine the issue of forfeiture, only the issue of whether the petitioner is an innocent owner. If the clerk determines that the petitioner is an innocent owner, the clerk shall release the motor vehicle to the petitioner subject to the same conditions as if the petitioner were an innocent owner under G.S. 20-28.2(e). The clerk shall send a copy of the order authorizing or denying release of the vehicle to the district attorney and the attorney for the county board of education. An order issued under this subsection finding that the petitioner failed to establish that the petitioner is an innocent owner may be reconsidered by the court as part of the forfeiture hearing conducted pursuant to G.S. 20-28.2(d).
(e2)      Pretrial Release of Motor Vehicle to Defendant Owner. -
(1)        If the seizure was for an offense involving impaired driving, a defendant motor vehicle owner may file a petition with the clerk of court seeking a pretrial determination that the defendant's license was not revoked pursuant to an impaired driving license revocation as defined in G.S. 20-28.2(a). The clerk shall schedule a hearing before a judge of the division in which the underlying criminal charge is pending for a hearing to be held within 10 business days or as soon thereafter as may be feasible. Notice of the hearing shall be given to the defendant, the district attorney, and the attorney for the county board of education. The clerk shall forward a copy of the petition to the district attorney for the district attorney's review. If, based on available information, the district attorney determines that the defendant's motor vehicle is not subject to forfeiture, the district attorney may note the State's consent to the release of the motor vehicle on the petition and return the petition to the clerk of court who shall enter an order releasing the motor vehicle to the defendant upon payment of all towing and storage charges incurred as a result of the seizure and impoundment of the motor vehicle, subject to the satisfactory proof of the identity of the defendant as a motor vehicle owner and the existence of financial responsibility to the extent required by Article 13 of this Chapter, and no hearing shall be held. The clerk shall send a copy of the order of release to the attorney for the county board of education. At any pretrial hearing conducted pursuant to this subdivision, the court is not required to determine the issue of the underlying offense of impaired driving only the existence of a prior drivers license revocation as an impaired driving license revocation. Accordingly, the State shall not be required to prove the underlying offense of impaired driving. An order issued under this subdivision finding that the defendant failed to establish that the defendant's license was not revoked pursuant to an impaired driving license revocation as defined in G.S. 20-28.2(a) may be reconsidered by the court as part of the forfeiture hearing conducted pursuant to G.S. 20-28.2(d).
(2)        If the seizure was for a felony speeding to elude arrest offense, a defendant motor vehicle owner may apply to the clerk of superior court in the county where the charges are pending for pretrial release of the motor vehicle. The clerk shall release the motor vehicle to the defendant motor vehicle owner conditioned upon payment of all towing and storage charges incurred as a result of seizure and impoundment of the motor vehicle under the following conditions:
a.         The motor vehicle has been seized for not less than 24 hours;
b.         A bond in an amount equal to the fair market value of the motor vehicle as defined by G.S. 20-28.2 has been executed and is secured by a cash deposit in the full amount of the bond, by a recordable deed of trust to real property in the full amount of the bond, by a bail bond under G.S. 58-71-1(2), or by at least one solvent surety, payable to the county school fund and conditioned on return of the motor vehicle, in substantially the same condition as it was at the time of seizure and without any new or additional liens or encumbrances, on the day of any hearing scheduled and noticed by the district attorney under G.S. 20-28.2(c), unless the motor vehicle has been permanently released;
c.         A bond posted to secure the release of this motor vehicle under this subdivision has not been previously ordered forfeited under G.S. 20-28.5.
In the event a defendant motor vehicle owner who obtains temporary possession of a seized motor vehicle pursuant to this subdivision does not return the motor vehicle on the day of the forfeiture hearing as noticed by the district attorney under G.S. 20-28.2(c) or otherwise violates a condition of pretrial release of the seized motor vehicle as set forth in this subdivision, the bond posted shall be ordered forfeited, and an order of seizure shall be issued by the court. Additionally, a defendant motor vehicle owner who willfully violates any condition of pretrial release may be held in civil or criminal contempt.
(e3)      Pretrial Release of Motor Vehicle to Lienholder. -
(1)        A lienholder may file a petition with the clerk of court requesting the court to order pretrial release of a seized motor vehicle. The lienholder shall serve a copy of the petition on all interested parties which shall include the registered owner, the titled owner, the district attorney, and the county board of education attorney. Upon 10 days' prior notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing sent by the lienholder to all interested parties, a judge, after a hearing, shall order a seized motor vehicle released to the lienholder conditioned upon payment of all towing and storage costs incurred as a result of the seizure and impoundment of the motor vehicle if the judge determines, by the greater weight of the evidence, that:
a.         Default on the obligation secured by the motor vehicle has occurred;
b.         As a consequence of default, the lienholder is entitled to possession of the motor vehicle;
c.         The lienholder agrees to sell the motor vehicle in accordance with the terms of its agreement and pursuant to the provisions of Part 6 of Article 9 of Chapter 25 of the General Statutes. Upon sale of the motor vehicle, the lienholder will pay to the clerk of court of the county in which the driver was charged all proceeds from the sale, less the amount of the lien in favor of the lienholder, and any towing and storage costs paid by the lienholder;
d.         The lienholder agrees not to sell, give, or otherwise transfer possession of the seized motor vehicle while the motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture, or the forfeited motor vehicle after the forfeiture hearing, to the defendant or the motor vehicle owner; and
e.         The seized motor vehicle while the motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture, or the forfeited motor vehicle after the forfeiture hearing, had not previously been released to the lienholder as a result of a prior seizure involving the same defendant or motor vehicle owner.
(2)        The clerk of superior court may order a seized vehicle released to the lienholder conditioned upon payment of all towing and storage costs incurred as a result of the seizure and impoundment of the motor vehicle at any time when all interested parties have, in writing, waived any rights that they may have to notice and a hearing, and the lienholder has agreed to the provision of subdivision (1)d. above. A lienholder who refuses to sell, give, or transfer possession of a seized motor vehicle while the motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture, or a forfeited motor vehicle after the forfeiture hearing, to:
a.         The defendant;
b.         The motor vehicle owner who owned the motor vehicle immediately prior to seizure pending the forfeiture hearing, or to forfeiture after the forfeiture hearing; or
c.         Any person acting on the behalf of the defendant or the motor vehicle owner,
shall not be liable for damages arising out of such refusal. However, any subsequent violation of the conditions of release by the lienholder shall be punishable by civil or criminal contempt.
(f),        (g) Repealed by Session Laws 1998-182, s. 3, effective December 1, 1998.
(h)        Insurance Proceeds. - In the event a motor vehicle is damaged incident to the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the defendant's arrest and seizure of the motor vehicle pursuant to this section, the county board of education, or its authorized designee, is authorized to negotiate the county board of education's interest with the insurance company and to compromise and accept settlement of any claim for damages. Property insurance proceeds accruing to the defendant, or other owner of the seized motor vehicle, shall be paid by the responsible insurance company directly to the clerk of superior court in the county where the motor vehicle driver was charged. If the motor vehicle is declared a total loss by the insurance company liable for the damages to the motor vehicle, the clerk of superior court, upon application of the county board of education, shall enter an order that the motor vehicle be released to the insurance company upon payment into the court of all insurance proceeds for damage to the motor vehicle after payment of towing and storage costs and all valid liens. The clerk of superior court shall provide the Division with a certified copy of the order entered pursuant to this subsection, and the Division shall transfer title to the insurance company or to such other person or entity as may be designated by the insurance company. Insurance proceeds paid to the clerk of court pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to forfeiture pursuant to G.S. 20-28.5 and shall be disbursed pursuant to further orders of the court. An affected motor vehicle owner or lienholder who objects to any agreed upon settlement under this subsection may file an independent claim with the insurance company for any additional monies believed owed. Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Chapter, nothing in this section or G.S. 20-28.2 shall require an insurance company to make payments in excess of those required pursuant to its policy of insurance on the seized motor vehicle.
(i)         Expedited Sale of Seized Motor Vehicles in Certain Cases. - In order to avoid additional liability for towing and storage costs pending resolution of the criminal proceedings of the defendant, the county board of education may, after expiration of 90 days from the date of seizure, sell any motor vehicle having a fair market value of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) or less. The county board of education may also sell a motor vehicle, regardless of the fair market value, any time the outstanding towing and storage costs exceed eighty-five percent (85%) of the fair market value of the vehicle, or with the consent of all the motor vehicle owners. Any sale conducted pursuant to this subsection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 20-28.5(a), and the proceeds of the sale, after the payment of outstanding towing and storage costs or reimbursement of towing and storage costs paid by a person other than the defendant, shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court. If an order of forfeiture is entered by the court, the court shall order the proceeds held by the clerk to be disbursed as provided in G.S. 20-28.5(b). If the court determines that the motor vehicle is not subject to forfeiture, the court shall order the proceeds held by the clerk to be disbursed first to pay the sale, towing, and storage costs, second to pay outstanding liens on the motor vehicle, and the balance to be paid to the motor vehicle owners.
(j)         Retrieval of Certain Personal Property. - At reasonable times, the entity charged with storing the motor vehicle may permit owners of personal property not affixed to the motor vehicle to retrieve those items from the motor vehicle, provided satisfactory proof of ownership of the motor vehicle or the items of personal property is presented to the storing entity.
(k)        County Board of Education Right to Appear and Participate in Proceedings. - The attorney for the county board of education shall be given notice of all proceedings regarding offenses related to a motor vehicle subject to forfeiture under this section. However, the notice requirement under this subsection does not apply to proceedings conducted under G.S. 20-28.3(e1). The attorney for the county board of education shall also have the right to appear and to be heard on all issues relating to the seizure, possession, release, forfeiture, sale, and other matters related to the seized vehicle under this section. With the prior consent of the county board of education, the district attorney may delegate to the attorney for the county board of education any or all of the duties of the district attorney under this section. Clerks of superior court, law enforcement agencies, and all other agencies with information relevant to the seizure, impoundment, release, or forfeiture of motor vehicles are authorized and directed to provide county boards of education with access to that information and to do so by electronic means when existing technology makes this type of transmission possible.
(l)         Payment of Fees Upon Conviction. - If the driver of a motor vehicle seized pursuant to this section is convicted of the underlying offense resulting in the seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to this section, the defendant shall be ordered to pay as restitution to the county board of education, the motor vehicle owner, or the lienholder the cost paid or owing for the towing, storage, and sale of the motor vehicle to the extent the costs were not covered by the proceeds from the forfeiture and sale of the motor vehicle. If the underlying offense resulting in the seizure is felony speeding to elude arrest pursuant to G.S. 20-141.5(b) or (b1) and the defendant's conviction is for misdemeanor speeding to elude arrest pursuant to G.S. 20-141.5(a), whether or not the reduced charge is by plea agreement, the defendant shall be ordered to pay as restitution to the county board of education, the motor vehicle owner, or the lienholder the cost paid or owing for the towing and storage of the motor vehicle. In addition, a civil judgment for the costs under this section in favor of the party to whom the restitution is owed shall be docketed by the clerk of superior court. If the defendant is sentenced to an active term of imprisonment, the civil judgment shall become effective and be docketed when the defendant's conviction becomes final. If the defendant is placed on probation, the civil judgment in the amount found by a judge during the probation revocation or termination hearing to be due shall become effective and be docketed by the clerk when the defendant's probation is revoked or terminated.
(m)       Trial Priority. - District court trials of offenses involving forfeitures of motor vehicles pursuant to G.S. 20-28.2 shall be scheduled on the arresting officer's next court date or within 30 days of the offense, whichever comes first.
Once scheduled, the case shall not be continued unless all of the following conditions are met:
(1)        A written motion for continuance is filed with notice given to the opposing party prior to the motion being heard.
(2)        The judge makes a finding of a "compelling reason" for the continuance.
(3)        The motion and finding are attached to the court case record.
Upon a determination of guilt, the issue of vehicle forfeiture shall be heard by the judge immediately, or as soon thereafter as feasible, and the judge shall issue the appropriate orders pursuant to G.S. 20-28.2(d).
Should a defendant appeal the conviction to superior court, any party who has not previously been heard on a petition for pretrial release under subsection (e1) or (e3) of this section or any party whose motor vehicle has not been the subject of a forfeiture hearing held pursuant to G.S. 20-28.2(d) may be heard on a petition for pretrial release pursuant to subsection (e1) or (e3) of this section. The provisions of subsection (e) of this section shall also apply to seized motor vehicles pending trial in superior court. Where a motor vehicle was released pursuant to subsection (e) of this section pending trial in district court, the release of the motor vehicle continues, and the terms and conditions of the original bond remain the same as those required for the initial release of the motor vehicle under subsection (e) of this section, pending the resolution of the underlying offense involving impaired driving in superior court.
(n)        Any order issued pursuant to this section authorizing the release of a seized vehicle shall require the payment of all towing and storage charges incurred as a result of the seizure and impoundment of the motor vehicle. This requirement shall not be waived.  (1997-379, s. 1.2; 1997-456, s. 31; 1998-182, s. 3; 1998-217, s. 62(a)-(c); 2000-169, s. 29; 2001-362, ss. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; 2001-487, s. 9; 2006-253, s. 32; 2013-243, s. 2.)