Can you Serve Alcohol to Your Children at Home

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The answer is NO.

Take a look at the following articles.

It turns out that there are a lot of rules that responsible adults and parents can break on vacation.  I’m not just talking about bedtime rules and no-ice-cream-before-dinner rules.  I’m talking about the criminal kind—the ones that can land you in jail or at least in a district court down east on a hot Monday morning.  I’ve written about a few of these rules before.  And this recent article in the News and Observer put everyone on notice that children under 16 cannot drive golf carts.  But I’ve recently learned a new rule: You cannot have a mixed drink on the beach.
That’s right.  You may not sit your so-far-over-21-that-I-don’t-really-remember-my-younger-self on the beach on the first unofficial day of summer and enjoy a strawberry daiquiri (unless you leave the liquor out). But don’t despair. You may drink a beer or sip some wine.
Alcoholic beverages in North Carolina are regulated under Chapter 18B of the General Statutes. Alcoholic beverages include malt beverages (such as beer), wine, liquor, and mixed beverages. The general rule is that a person may only have liquor and fortified wine (wine with more than 16 percent alcohol) in places expressly permitted by statute. See G.S. 18B-301(f)(4). The rule for beer and unfortified wine (wine with 16 percent or less alcohol) is the opposite: A person who is at least 21 years old may possess beer and wine anywhere except where it is expressly prohibited. See G.S. 18B-300.  Local government lawyers might think of this as home rule for beer and wine.
Where may one lawfully drink liquor and fortified wine? 
At home. A person who is at least 21 years old may possess any amount of liquor and fortified wine at his or her home or a temporary residence, such as a hotel room.
Up to 8 liters at other locations. A person also may possess up to 8 liters of liquor and fortified wine (combined) at:

• another person’s residence with that person’s consent;
• any other property not primarily used for commercial purposes and not open to the public at the time the alcoholic beverage is possessed, if the owner or other person in charge of the property consents; and
• a restaurant, hotel, private club, community theatre, or a veterans organization with a brown-bagging permit.

At special occasions. A person may possess any amount of fortified wine or liquor for a private party, private reception, or private special occasion, at:

• Any property not primarily used for commercial purposes, which is under the person’s exclusive control and supervision, and which is not open to the public during the event; and
• The licensed premises of a restaurant, hotel, eating establishment, private club, or convention center for which the ABC Commission has issued a special occasions permit if the person is the host of that private function and has the permission of the permittee.

Just as a person may possess fortified wine and liquor at the aforementioned places, he or she also may consume such beverages at any such location. G.S. 18B-301(d).
At a place with a permit. And, of course, the consumption of fortified wine and liquor is permissible at a location with on-premises fortified wine and mixed beverage permits. G.S. 18B-1001. An on-premises fortified wine permit may be issued to a restaurant, hotel, private club, community theatre, winery, or a convention center. A mixed beverage permit may be issued to any of these types of establishments other than a winery and also may be issued to a nonprofit or political organization.
Not on the beach.  Beaches do not constitute the sort of premises for which a permit may be issued authorizing the possession and consumption of fortified wine or mixed drinks.  While the dry sand portion of the beach – generally the area above the high tide line – may be privately owned, private persons cannot exercise the exclusive control over beaches that is required to authorize the possession of fortified wine and liquor pursuant to G.S. 18B-301(c)(2). Ocean beaches in North Carolina have “from time immemorial” been open to the public for its free use and enjoyment. G.S. 77-20.  Thus, even the owners of dry sand portions of the beach lack the ability to exclude the public from access. See Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, __ N.C. App. ___, ___, 780 S.E.2d 187, 196 (2015) (“[P]ublic right of access to dry sand beaches in North Carolina is so firmly rooted in the custom and history of North Carolina that it has become a part of the public consciousness. Native-born North Carolinians do not generally question whether the public has the right to move freely between the wet sand and dry sand portions of our ocean beaches.”).
Beer and wine.  I mentioned earlier that a person who is at least 21 years old may possess and consume beer and unfortified wine anywhere except where it is specifically prohibited. No state law prohibits a person who is at least 21 years old from possessing and consuming beer and wine on public beaches. Indeed, the town where I vacation most often, Emerald Isle, adopted an ordinance expressly stating that such possession and consumption is lawful. Emerald Isle, like many cities and towns, does prohibit the consumption of beer, wine and other alcoholic beverages on its public streets and on other public property in the town. See 18B-300(c)(1)(authorizing cities and towns to adopt such regulations).
What’s the penalty? Possession or consumption of fortified wine or liquor on unauthorized premises is a Class 1 misdemeanor. G.S. 18B-301(f)(2), -102(b). The offense is waivable, meaning that one may plead guilty to the offense in writing and pay a fine of $25 plus $203 in court costs in lieu of appearing in court. There were nearly 600 such charges last year, 9 in Carteret County and 55 in New Hanover County.
So, if you’d rather stay on the beach and out of court this summer, forget about that daiquiri and have a Bud Light or some muscadine wine instead.

Expired Registration

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Great article on changes to registration in NC and dealing with tickets for expired registration.

Gray is in.  And DMV knows it.   
The News and Observer’s Road Worrier, Bruce Siceloff, reports that DMV is dropping its colorful registration renewal stickers in favor of neutral gray ones—and saving more than $70,000 a year as a result.  A single gray sticker featuring both the month and year will replace the separate month and year stickers that now adorn North Carolina plates.
Siceloff’s report got me thinking about those pesky registration violations.  C’mon, you know you’ve had one.  Or someone in your family has.
Expired tags.  Indeed, there were nearly 230,000 charges in 2014 for willfully displaying an expired registration plate on a vehicle. Violation of this provision is a Class 3 misdemeanor.  G.S. 20-111(2).  This is by far the most common type of registration violation and is the second most commonly charged criminal offense in the state (right behind speeding).
But there are several other ways in which people run afoul of the vehicle registration statutes.
Revoked registration. G.S. 20-111(2) also makes it a Class 3 misdemeanor to display or possess a registration card, certificate of title, or registration plate that has been canceled, revoked or suspended.  Such suspensions can result from failure to pay tolls due to the NC Turnpike Authority and failure to pay a fine imposed under G.S. 20-217 for passing a stopped school bus, among other misdeeds. More than 36,000 defendants were charged with this variety of registration offense in 2014.
Fictitious or altered registration. Possessing or displaying a registration card, certificate of title, or registration plate that you know has been altered or that you know is fictitious also is a Class 3 misdemeanor. There were more than 26,000 charges for this offense last year.
No registration. Driving a vehicle on a highway that is not registered or allowing someone else to so drive a vehicle you own also is a Class 3 misdemeanor. G.S. 20-111(1). More than 20,000 defendants were charged with this offense in 2014.  It likewise is unlawful to fail to display a current registration plate when driving a vehicle on a highway or to allow someone else to so drive a vehicle you own. Charges for this offense are far less common than those previously mentioned. There were 3,166 such charges in 2014.
Lending a plate. It is unlawful to give, lend or borrow a license plate for use on a vehicle other than that for which it was issued. G.S. 20-111(3). Both the giver and the recipient are guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. When a license plate is found being so improperly used, it must be canceled. There were nearly 4,000 charges for this offense last year.
Keep it clean.  G.S. 20-63(g) generally prohibits the alteration, disguise or concealment of numbers on a registration plate. A person who does any of the following commits a Class 2 misdemeanor:

• Willfully mutilates, bends, or twists a registration plate
• Causes a registration plate to be covered or partially covered by a bumper, light, spare tire, tire rack, strap, or other device
• Paints, enamels, embosses, stamps, prints, perforates, or alters a registration plate or its figures or letters
• Deposits oil, grease, or another substance on the plate for the purpose of making dust stick to it
• Defaces, disfigures, changes, or attempts to change a letter or figure on a registration plate
• Displays a registration plate in other than a horizontal upright position

In 2014, there were 647 charges for having a registration plate improperly attached, and 394 charges for other misdemeanor violations of G.S. 20-63(g).
License plate frames and covers. G.S. 20-63(g) also regulates license plate frames and covers.  A motor vehicle operator who does any of the following commits an infraction:

• Intentionally covers any number or registration renewal sticker on a registration plate with material that makes the number or registration renewal sticker illegible
• Covers a registration plate with any frame or transparent, clear, or color-tinted cover that makes a number or letter in the vehicle’s registration, the State name on the plate, or a number or month on the registration renewal sticker illegible
• Willfully covers or causes to be covered any part of a registration plate by a device designed to prevent or interfere with the taking of clear photograph of the registration plate by a traffic control or toll collection system

Nearly 1,000 defendants were charged with infractions under G.S. 20-63(g) in 2014.
Failure to sign registration card. The next time you get in your car, open your glove box, and pull out your registration. Is it signed? If it isn’t, you’re in violation of G.S. 20-57(c), which requires that the owner of a vehicle sign the registration card with pen and ink. Registration cards must be carried in the vehicle to which they refer at all times and must be displayed upon an officer’s demand. Violation of these provisions is an infraction. Nearly 1,500 defendants were cited last year for failure to sign their registration cards, and more than twice that many for failure to carry them.

IMPLIED CONSENT TO BLOOD TEST

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North Carolina's Implied Consent law requires the arresting officer to give certain warnings before taking a breath test.  Below is a great article on how that apples to blood test taken with and without a warrent.
As always, thanks to Shea Denning for her great writing.

In most DWI cases, the State obtains evidence of a defendant’s alcohol concentration from a breath-testing machine.  In order for the results of such a breath test to be admissible at trial, the State must follow the procedures set forth in the implied consent statutes, G.S. 20-16.2 and G.S. 20-139.1. Those statutes require, among other things, that a suspect be advised of his right to refuse testing and the consequences of such a refusal and that he be afforded an opportunity to contact a witness to observe the testing. Less frequently, a law enforcement officer will request that a person charged with an implied consent offense such as impaired driving submit to a blood test. Like the breath test results, the analysis of the defendant’s blood sample obtained pursuant to such a request is admissible at trial only if the State follows the procedures set forth in the implied consent statutes.  If the request for a blood test follows an earlier request for a breath test, then the officer must re-advise the suspect of his implied consent rights before asking for consent.  None of these rules apply, however, when blood is withdrawn pursuant to a search warrant.

Purpose of Implied Consent Statutes. Implied consent laws were enacted in North Carolina, as in the other forty-nine states, to make it easier for the State to gather reliable chemical evidence of impairment while, at the same time, avoiding potentially violent citizen-police confrontations. If the State was required to obtain a search warrant in every impaired driving case to justify the search of the defendant’s breath, blood, or other bodily fluids, DWI investigations would take more time. If there was no penalty for a suspect’s refusal to cooperate with such testing, compliance presumably would drop.  And if law enforcement officers were required to physically force suspects to comply with nonconsensual testing in every case, one might expect an increase in physical resistance from suspects.
North Carolina’s implied consent statutes require that a suspect be notified of certain rights before being asked to submit to testing.  A suspect must be informed that (1) she may refuse, but her license will be revoked; (2) the test results or refusal will be admissible at trial; (3) certain results will trigger an immediate license revocation; (4) she may seek her own test, and (5) she may call an attorney for advice and select a witness to view testing, but testing may not be delayed for more than 30 minutes. This notice is designed to incentivize the suspect’s compliance as well as to satisfy due process.  North Carolina’s courts have held that the results of an implied consent test carried out without the defendant having first been advised of his implied consent rights are inadmissible. State v. Williams, ___ N.C. App. ___, 759 S.E.2d 350 (2014).
Search warrants. But implied consent testing isn’t the only way for the State to gather chemical evidence of impairment. When a suspect refuses to be tested, or is incapable of refusing, a law enforcement officer may apply to a magistrate for a search warrant that authorizes the withdrawal of the defendant’s blood for testing. And, though it seldom does so, the State may forego implied consent altogether, opting instead to seek a search warrant for blood at the outset of its investigation. When an officer swears to facts that establish probable cause that evidence of an impairing substance is present in the bodily fluid sought from the person and that the presence of such an impairing substance is evidence of a crime, a search warrant properly may issue. Search warrants for blood in DWI cases typically are issued on form AOC-CR-155. Warrants in this form direct law enforcement officers to “take the person named in the application to a physician, registered nurse, emergency medical technician or other qualified person to obtain sample(s) of blood and/or urine described in the application from the person named in the application” and “to seize the sample(s).”
Implied consent procedures don’t apply when there is a search warrant. Implied consent procedures don’t govern the withdrawal of a suspect’s blood pursuant to a search warrant. Thus, there is no requirement that a suspect be advised of the implied consent rights codified in G.S. 20-16.2 before a search warrant for blood is issued.
Why? As I noted earlier, implied consent statutes are primarily designed to facilitate the gathering of chemical evidence—not to stymie it. Executing a search warrant for the withdrawal of a defendant’s blood remains a viable alternative option for obtaining such evidence.  Indeed, the implied consent statutes themselves recognize this. See G.S. 20-139.1(a) (“This section does not limit the introduction of other competent evidence as to a person’s alcohol concentration or results of other tests showing the presence of an impairing substance, including other chemical tests.”) Moreover, once a neutral, detached judicial official has issued a search warrant, many of the concerns addressed by the implied consent notice are no longer valid. The suspect’s consent is unnecessary. The license revocation provisions for willful refusal do not apply. The suspect has no need to consult an attorney regarding his or her consent, as the suspect no longer has a choice in the matter.
But what about the definition of chemical analysis? G.S. 20-16.2(a) requires that “[b]efore any type of chemical analysis is administered, the person charged shall be taken before a chemical analyst” who must advise the person of his/her rights.  The term “chemical analysis” is defined as a breath, blood, or urine test “performed in accordance with G.S. 20-139.1.”  G.S. 20-4.01(3a).  Even though blood tests performed pursuant to a search warrant are performed in accordance with G.S. 20-139.1, the State routinely relies on the provisions of G.S. 20-139.1 in admitting such results into evidence.
Plus, there’s footnote in Williams, ___ N.C. App. at  ___, 759 S.E.2d at 354 n.1, stating that “upon a defendant’s refusal to provide a blood sample as requested, law enforcement may seek a warrant to obtain the blood sample for testing.  N.C.G.S. § 20-139.1(b5).”  Doesn’t that mean that blood draws pursuant to search warrants subject to the implied consent procedures?
Warrant searches are different. Searches pursuant to a search warrant are constitutionally permissible and are authorized by Article 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, unlike implied consent testing, there was no need for the General Assembly to enact statutes permitting and regulating the issuance and execution of such warrants in Chapter 20 cases. The inapplicability of implied consent warnings to search warrant searches, for the reasons discussed above, provides evidence that the General Assembly did not in fact attempt to separately regulate such searches in DWI cases.
As for footnote 1 of Williams, G.S. 20-139.1(b5) was cited because Williams involved a DWI and a fatality. G.S. 20-139.1(b5) addresses subsequent testing in DWI cases generally, requiring that a suspect be re-advised of his implied consent rights before being requested to submit to a subsequent chemical analysis under the implied consent procedures. It refers to the issuance of search warrants only for cases involving charges of death or serious injury by vehicle, requiring in such cases that a law enforcement officer seek a warrant to obtain a blood sample if the person is charged with a violation of G.S. 20-141.4 and there is probable cause to believe the offense was alcohol-related. In the routine DWI case, the matter of whether to apply for a search warrant is left to the officer’s discretion.
Thus, the citation of G.S. 20-139.1(b5) in Williams does not signify that advisement of rights is required before a search warrant for a defendant’s blood is executed.