Showing posts with label Wake County DWI. DWLR. Driving while license revoked. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wake County DWI. DWLR. Driving while license revoked. Show all posts

Friday, April 6, 2018

Speeding in a Sub Division

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I often get clients who are either speeding or running stop signs in parking lots or in subdivisions.  Below is a great article from Shea Denning of the North Carolina School of Government on the issue.



Many subdivisions consisting of private roadways have these signs, and they often admonish drivers not to exceed a very specific speed that is not a multiple of five, such as 17 miles per hour. But so long as the subdivision roads remain privately owned and are not dedicated to a municipality, driving in excess of these specific speed limits is not a speeding infraction.

Why not? G.S. 20-141(b) makes it unlawful to drive in excess of the following speeds: 35 miles per hour inside municipal limits and 55 miles per hour outside municipal limits. The subsection does not specify the types of roadways to which it applies, but related provisions of G.S. 20-141 make clear that these limitations apply only on streets or highways, which are roadways open to the public as a matter of right. G.S. 20-4.01(13), (46). G.S. 20-141(e) permits local authorities, which include a county, municipality, or other territorial district with a local board or body that is authorized to adopt local police regulations, to adopt ordinances authorizing higher or lower speeds than those set out in G.S. 20-141(b) upon streets that are not part of the State highway system. (Local ordinances may not, however, authorize any speed in excess of 55 miles per hour.) Speed limits set pursuant to G.S. 20-141(e) are effective when appropriate signs giving notice of the speed limit are erected upon the part of the streets affected.

Thus, a municipality could adopt a 17 mile-per-hour speed limit, but only for a city street. G.S. 20-141(e); see also G.S. 160A-296 (authorizing a city to regulate public streets, sidewalks, alleys and bridges as discussed here).

Private roads within a subdivision that have not been dedicated to the city are not streets. They may be open to the public, but they are not open to the public as a matter of right. Instead, such private roadways are properly classified as public vehicular areas, which are defined in part as roads used by vehicular traffic within or leading to a gated or non-gated subdivision or community, whether or not the subdivision or community roads have been offered for dedication to the public. G.S. 20-4.01(32)c.

But before you put the pedal to the metal, you should know this. Simply because exceeding the specified speed limit posted on a private subdivision road is not an infraction, a driver may not speed in such an area with impunity. A separate provision of the speeding statute, G.S. 20-141(a), makes it unlawful to drive a vehicle on a street or public vehicular area at a speed “greater than is reasonable and prudent” under existing conditions. Driving too fast for conditions on a private subdivision street is, therefore, a speeding infraction. In addition, driving a vehicle in a public vehicular area “without due caution and circumspection” and at a speed or in a way that endangers, or is likely to endanger, people or property constitutes reckless driving under G.S. 20-140(b), a Class 2 misdemeanor.

Friday, March 30, 2018

Hit and Run v. Failure to Report Accident

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North Carolina has two requirements when in an accident.  The first, is triggered when you are in any accident.  That being the duty to stop and exchange information with the person you hit.  The second is the duty to report the accident to law enforcemnt.

NCGS 20-166
§ 20-166.  Duty to stop in event of a crash; furnishing information or assistance to injured person, etc.; persons assisting exempt from civil liability.
(a)        The driver of any vehicle who knows or reasonably should know:
(1)        That the vehicle which he or she is operating is involved in a crash; and
(2)        That the crash has resulted in serious bodily injury, as defined in G.S. 14-32.4, or death to any person;
shall immediately stop his or her vehicle at the scene of the crash. The driver shall remain with the vehicle at the scene of the crash until a law-enforcement officer completes the investigation of the crash or authorizes the driver to leave and the vehicle to be removed, unless remaining at the scene places the driver or others at significant risk of injury.
Prior to the completion of the investigation of the crash by a law enforcement officer, or the consent of the officer to leave, the driver may not facilitate, allow, or agree to the removal of the vehicle from the scene for any purpose other than to call for a law enforcement officer, to call for medical assistance or medical treatment as set forth in subsection (b) of this section, or to remove oneself or others from significant risk of injury. If the driver does leave for a reason permitted by this subsection, then the driver must return with the vehicle to the accident scene within a reasonable period of time, unless otherwise instructed by a law enforcement officer. A willful violation of this subsection shall be punished as a Class F felony.
(a1)      The driver of any vehicle who knows or reasonably should know:
(1)        That the vehicle which he or she is operating is involved in a crash; and
(2)        That the crash has resulted in injury;
shall immediately stop his or her vehicle at the scene of the crash. The driver shall remain with the vehicle at the scene of the crash until a law enforcement officer completes the investigation of the crash or authorizes the driver to leave and the vehicle to be removed, unless remaining at the scene places the driver or others at significant risk of injury.
Prior to the completion of the investigation of the crash by a law enforcement officer, or the consent of the officer to leave, the driver may not facilitate, allow, or agree to the removal of the vehicle from the scene for any purpose other than to call for a law enforcement officer, to call for medical assistance or medical treatment as set forth in subsection (b) of this section, or to remove oneself or others from significant risk of injury. If the driver does leave for a reason permitted by this subsection, then the driver must return with the vehicle to the crash scene within a reasonable period of time, unless otherwise instructed by a law enforcement officer. A willful violation of this subsection shall be punished as a Class H felony.
(b)        In addition to complying with the requirements of subsections (a) and (a1) of this section, the driver as set forth in subsections (a) and (a1) shall give his or her name, address, driver's license number and the license plate number of the vehicle to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with, provided that the person or persons are physically and mentally capable of receiving such information, and shall render to any person injured in such crash reasonable assistance, including the calling for medical assistance if it is apparent that such assistance is necessary or is requested by the injured person. A violation of this subsection is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
(c)        The driver of any vehicle, when the driver knows or reasonably should know that the vehicle which the driver is operating is involved in a crash which results:
(1)        Only in damage to property; or
(2)        In injury or death to any person, but only if the operator of the vehicle did not know and did not have reason to know of the death or injury;
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash. If the crash is a reportable crash, the driver shall remain with the vehicle at the scene of the crash until a law enforcement officer completes the investigation of the crash or authorizes the driver to leave and the vehicle to be removed, unless remaining at the scene places the driver or others at significant risk of injury.
Prior to the completion of the investigation of the crash by a law enforcement officer, or the consent of the officer to leave, the driver may not facilitate, allow, or agree to the removal of the vehicle from the scene, for any purpose other than to call for a law enforcement officer, to call for medical assistance or medical treatment, or to remove oneself or others from significant risk of injury. If the driver does leave for a reason permitted by this subsection, then the driver must return with the vehicle to the accident scene within a reasonable period of time, unless otherwise instructed by a law enforcement officer. A willful violation of this subsection is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
(c1)      In addition to complying with the requirement of subsection (c) of this section, the driver as set forth in subsection (c) shall give his or her name, address, driver's license number and the license plate number of his vehicle to the driver or occupants of any other vehicle involved in the crash or to any person whose property is damaged in the crash. If the damaged property is a parked and unattended vehicle and the name and location of the owner is not known to or readily ascertainable by the driver of the responsible vehicle, the driver shall furnish the information required by this subsection to the nearest available peace officer, or, in the alternative, and provided the driver thereafter within 48 hours fully complies with G.S. 20-166.1(c), shall immediately place a paper-writing containing the information in a conspicuous place upon or in the damaged vehicle. If the damaged property is a guardrail, utility pole, or other fixed object owned by the Department of Transportation, a public utility, or other public service corporation to which report cannot readily be made at the scene, it shall be sufficient if the responsible driver shall furnish the information required to the nearest peace officer or make written report thereof containing the information by U.S. certified mail, return receipt requested, to the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles within five days following the collision. A violation of this subsection is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
(c2)      Notwithstanding subsections (a), (a1), and (c) of this section, if a crash occurs on a main lane, ramp, shoulder, median, or adjacent area of a highway, each vehicle shall be moved as soon as possible out of the travel lane and onto the shoulder or to a designated accident investigation site to complete the requirements of this section and minimize interference with traffic if all of the following apply:
(1)        The crash has not resulted in injury or death to any person or the drivers did not know or have reason to know of any injury or death.
(2)        Each vehicle can be normally and safely driven. For purposes of this subsection, a vehicle can be normally and safely driven if it does not require towing and can be operated under its own power and in its usual manner, without additional damage or hazard to the vehicle, other traffic, or the roadway.
(d)       Any person who renders first aid or emergency assistance at the scene of a motor vehicle crash on any street or highway to any person injured as a result of the accident, shall not be liable in civil damages for any acts or omissions relating to the services rendered, unless the acts or omissions amount to wanton conduct or intentional wrongdoing.
(e)        The Division of Motor Vehicles shall revoke the drivers license of a person convicted of violating subsection (a) or (a1) of this section for a period of one year, unless the court makes a finding that a longer period of revocation is appropriate under the circumstances of the case. If the court makes this finding, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall revoke that person's drivers license for two years. Upon a first conviction only for a violation of subsection (a1) of this section, a trial judge may allow limited driving privileges in the manner set forth in G.S. 20-179.3(b)(2) during any period of time during which the drivers license is revoked.  (1937, c. 407, s. 128; 1939, c. 10, ss. 1, 11/2; 1943, c. 439; 1951, cc. 309, 794, 823; 1953, cc. 394, 793; c. 1340, s. 1; 1955, c. 913, s. 8; 1965, c. 176; 1967, c. 445; 1971, c. 958, s. 1; 1973, c. 507, s. 5; 1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1977, c. 464, s. 34; 1979, c. 667, s. 32; 1983, c. 912, s. 1; 1985, c. 324, ss. 1-4; 1993, c. 539, ss. 373-375, 1260; 1994, Ex. Sess., c. 24, s. 14(c); 2003-310, s. 2; 2003-394, s. 1; 2005-460, s. 1; 2008-128, s. 1.)
 
 

Tuesday, August 9, 2016

Search of Vehicle based soley on ordor of marijuana

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Two states are looking at this issue very differently.  Thanks to NCSOG and Capital Media Services for their articles.

The existence of probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to search a vehicle occupant based on an odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle present separate legal issues. The North Carolina Court of Appeals on August 2, 2016, ruled in State v. Pigford that although an officer had probable cause to search a vehicle, he did not have probable cause to search a vehicle occupant based on the marijuana odor. However, another theory mentioned by the court may ultimately support the admission of the illegally-seized evidence at the retrial of the case.
Facts and trial court ruling. The defendant was driving a vehicle with one front seat passenger and was stopped at a motor vehicle checkpoint. The stopping officer detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle’s front driver-side window, but he was unable to establish the odor’s exact location. The officer ordered the defendant out of the vehicle and searched him, finding cocaine and a straw located in the defendant’s back pocket. The officer arrested the defendant, placed him in a patrol car, and a search of the vehicle discovered a bag of marijuana under the driver’s seat and a stolen handgun on the back passenger seat. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the odor of marijuana established probable cause to search the defendant. The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon.
Court of Appeals ruling. The court first noted that it was not contested that the officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle, including possessions within it. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). [For a list of cases that have ruled the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle authorizes a warrantless search of the vehicle, see Arrest, Search, and Investigation in North Carolina, p. 182, n. 56 (4th ed. 2011).]
The court stated, however, that under State v. Malunda, 230 N.C. App. 355 (2013), probable cause to search the vehicle and its possessions based on the generalized odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle does not include a search of the passengers, absent additional facts linking marijuana to a particular passenger. In Malunda, officers during a lawful traffic stop ordered the defendant-passenger out of the car and detained him on the curb. They went back to the driver side of the vehicle and noticed a strong odor of marijuana that they had not smelled on the passenger side. They removed the driver and searched the vehicle, and they found marijuana in the driver-side door. Officers then searched the defendant-passenger and found crack cocaine on him. The Malunda court ruled that the odor of marijuana provided probable cause to search the vehicle, but not the defendant-passenger. And because there was nothing linking the marijuana to the defendant-passenger beside his presence in the vehicle, the search of his person was not supported by probable cause particularized to him.
The court distinguished the ruling in State v. Yates, 162 N.C. App. 118 (2004), in which the odor of marijuana on the defendant supported probable cause to search his person. There the defendant walked by an officer twice, each time emanating a strong odor of marijuana. The court in Pigford noted that, unlike in Yates, the State did not offer any evidence that the marijuana odor was attributable to the defendant. The officer testified that when he stood next to the driver-side window, he smelled marijuana “inside the car,” though his description of the source of the odor was no more precise. He could not recall whether the other vehicle windows were rolled down, nor did he approach the passenger-side window where the odor could have been just as potent. He did not testify whether he smelled marijuana on the defendant after ordering him out of the car. The court stated that to the extent the odor could have been attributed to the defendant, it could have been equally attributable to the front-seat passenger or somewhere else inside the vehicle. Thus the court concluded that although the officer may have had probable cause to search the vehicle, he did not have probable cause to search the defendant.
Despite the defendant’s winning argument on the search issue and being awarded a new trial, it was not a compete win. The court of appeals on its own raised the issue whether the inevitable discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applied to make the illegally-seized evidence admissible at the new trial. The inevitable discovery rule, set out in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), provides that unlawfully-obtained evidence may nevertheless be admitted at trial if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence ultimately would have been discovered through lawful means. In this case, because the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle, which contained marijuana and a stolen gun, the issue is whether the state can prove that the cocaine on the defendant’s person would have been inevitably discovered through a search of the defendant incident to his arrest for possessing marijuana.
Comments. It is always easy to say in hindsight what could have been done to seize the evidence legally in Pigford. Because the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana, if that had been done initially instead of searching the defendant, then the officer would have discovered the bag of marijuana under the driver’s seat. And then the officer would have had probable cause to arrest the defendant-driver and search him incident to arrest, resulting in the lawful discovery of the cocaine in the defendant’s back pocket.
So if there is a generalized odor of marijuana from the vehicle and no other incriminating facts (e.g., incriminating evidence in the vehicle or incriminating statements or behavior by a vehicle occupant) to point to an occupant’s connection to the marijuana, then it is unlikely that a court will find probable cause to uphold a search of that occupant. Under these circumstances, an officer may detain the occupant(s), conduct a frisk if justified, and search the vehicle for marijuana. Depending what, if anything, is found will guide the officer concerning what additional actions are justified.

PHOENIX -- Got marijuana? Not legally? Might want to keep the smell down.

A pair of new court rulings Monday allows the police to pursue a search of your place or your vehicle solely based on the odor.

Attorneys for both men who were convicted based on such searches argued that the 2010 voter-approved law which allows some people with certain medical conditions to legally possess or use marijuana means that the smell alone is no longer evidence that a crime is occurring. The fact that neither of them was a medical marijuana cardholder, the lawyers said, is irrelevant.

But Chief Justice Scott Bales, writing for the unanimous court, said that 2010 law did not legalize the drug for the vast majority of Arizonans.

"The odor of marijuana in most circumstances will warrant a reasonable person believing there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime is present,' he wrote.

And Bales specifically rejected the contention that the law -- and the fact some people can possess and use the drug -- means that the smell alone cannot trigger a search.

"Under that view, no person in Arizona would be subject to search or seizure by state or local police officers based only on an officer seeing or smelling marijuana,' the chief justice said. He said the 2010 law "does not broadly alter the legal status of marijuana but instead specifies particular rights, immunities, and obligations for qualifying patients and others, such as designated caregivers.'

And the court specifically rejected arguments that a search based merely on smell runs afoul of state and federal constitutional provisions protecting the right to privacy.

"The right to privacy ... is not a guarantee against (ITALICS) all (ROMAN) government searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones,' Bales explained.

That, in turn, gets back to the fact that marijuana use remains illegal for most of the public, at least for the time being.

The most recent figures from the Arizona Department of Health Services show there are close to 98,000 people who are legally qualified to use the drug. ON top of that there are 853 people certified as "caregivers' plus another 2,625 dispensary agents.

By contrast, the state's population exceeds 6.7 million.

"In this respect, registered qualifying patients are not denied Fourth Amendment rights or privileges based on their medical marijuana use,' Bales wrote. "They are simply treated like the broader public.'

He stressed, though, that police, in deciding whether there is enough evidence for a search, "cannot ignore indicia of AMMA-compliant marijuana possession and use that could dispel probable cause.'

But David Euchner, a deputy Pima County public defender, said that is hardly enough to protect individual rights.

"How would you feel if you were the guy using legally and the police broke into your house and kicked down the door and only later found out that you had a (medical marijuana) card?' he asked. "Now, according to this decision, they basically are allowed to search first, ask questions later.'

Euchner also said the ruling would appear to allow searches based solely on smell -- especially of vehicles where a warrant is unnecessary -- even if voters approve a ballot measure in November to allow Arizonans to possess and use marijuana for recreational purposes.

He noted the initiative only legalizes possession of up to one ounce of the drug by individuals.

"Can the officer search first and determine whether he had the right amount?' Euchner asked.

"We've have situations where the officers know that the person is a (medical marijuana) patient and still say, 'I'm going to search you just to see if you have the right amount,' ' he said.

What's legal right now under the 2010 law is that those with certain medical conditions can obtain up to 2 1/2 ounces of marijuana every two weeks. Those who qualify are issued special cards by the health department.

"Presentation of a valid AMMA registry identification card, therefore, could indicate that marijuana is being lawfully possessed or used,' Bales explained.

"Such information could effectively dispel the probable cause (for a search) resulting from the officer's detection of marijuana by sight or smell, unless of course other facts suggest the use or possession is not pursuant to AMMA,' he continued. "The ultimate inquiry, as in other probable cause determinations, turns on a practical, common-sense consideration of the totality of the circumstances.'

And there's something else.

Bales said the 2010 law does not provide patients with greater protections from searches or increased expectations of privacy than those enjoyed by the public at large. What it does, he said, is protect a legitimate cardholder from arrest, prosecution or any other penalty for their medical use of marijuana.

Monday's ruling most immediately affects two individuals.

One is Ronald J. Sisco II who was represented by Euchner.

His arrest stems from police saying they smelled the "overpowering odor of fresh marijuana' at a storage warehouse on West 35th Street in South Tucson. Based on that, they obtained a search warrant and, according to court records, found discovered 357 plans and 53 pounds of cultivated marijuana. Sisco, who apparently was living in the unit, was convicted of multiple charges and sentenced to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which was 3.5 years.

Monday's ruling affirms the decision of the trial judge to allow the marijuana police found into evidence.

The second case involves Ian Cheatham whose vehicle was stopped by police on the suspicion that the window tinting violated Arizona law.

Officers said they noticed a "pretty strong' odor of burnt marijuana. They then searched the vehicle and found what was described as a marble-sized piece of unburnt drug under the driver's seat.


Tuesday, May 3, 2016

New caselaw on HGN Testimoney

Great new case on the State using HGN testimony.  This case requires that the officer be qualified as an expert under Daubert.





Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

STATE of North Carolina v. William Edward GODWIN, III, Defendant.

No. COA15–766.

    Decided: April 19, 2016

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Teresa L. Townsend, for the State. Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse Jr., for defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 November 2013 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2016. Mecklenburg County, No. 11 CRS 202887.
William Edward Godwin, III (defendant), appeals his conviction for driving while impaired following a jury trial in superior court. The question for decision is whether Rule 702(a1) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence requires a witness to be qualified as an expert before he may testify to the issue of impairment related to HGN test results. We hold that it does.
I. Background
The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 18 January 2011, at approximately 10:14 p.m., Daniel Kennerly, an officer with the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department, observed defendant driving fourteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit and executed a traffic stop. When he approached the vehicle, Officer Kennerly noticed that defendant's eyes were red and glassy, and he detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant's breath. Officer Kennerly asked defendant where he was coming from and how much alcohol, if any, he had consumed that evening. In response, defendant stated that he had just left a restaurant where he had consumed three beers. Officer Kennerly then asked defendant to step out of his vehicle and began an investigation for impaired driving.
As part of his investigation, Officer Kennerly administered three field sobriety tests: the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand. He observed four out of six possible indicators of impairment during the HGN test, six out of eight possible indicators during the walk-and-turn, and two out of four possible indicators during the one-leg stand. At that time, Officer Kennerly placed defendant under arrest for driving while impaired and transported him to the Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office's Intoximeter site to perform a EC/IR II breath test. The results of the Intoximeter showed that defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was .08.
On 20 December 2011, defendant was convicted in Mecklenburg County District Court of driving while impaired. He appealed to superior court, and the matter came to trial at the 12 November 2013 Criminal Session of the Superior Court for Mecklenburg County. At trial, defendant objected to Officer Kennerly's HGN testimony, arguing that the officer had to be qualified as an expert under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence before such testimony could be admitted. Over defendant's objections, the trial court allowed Officer Kennerly to testify, based on his training and experience, as to his administration of the HGN test, the indicators of impairment, and his opinion regarding defendant's impairment based on the indicators which he observed. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of driving while impaired. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
II. Discussion
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony regarding the HGN test results. Specifically, defendant maintains that Rule 702(a1) requires a party offering testimony about the results of an HGN test to do so through a properly qualified witness who has been accepted as an expert by the trial court. Defendant contends, therefore, that in overruling his objection and allowing Officer Kennerly to offer such testimony as a lay witness, the trial court acted under a misapprehension of the law.
“Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C.App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010) (citing Moody v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 191 N.C.App. 256, 264, 664 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2008)). “ ‘Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of HGN evidence in State v. Helms, 348 N.C. 578, 580, 504 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1998). On discretionary review, the Court agreed with our conclusion that “the HGN test does not measure behavior a lay person would commonly associate with intoxication, but rather represents specialized knowledge that must be presented to the jury by a qualified expert.” Id. at 581, 504 S.E.2d at 295 (emphasis added); see also State v. Helms, 127 N.C.App. 375, 379, 490 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1997) (“[The HGN test] is based upon a scientific principle that the extent and manner in which one's eye quivers can be a reliable measure of the amount of alcohol one has consumed.” (citation omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 348 N.C. 578, 504 S.E.2d 293. This meant that under the prior version of Rule 702, the State had to show, inter alia, that the methodology underlying the test was “sufficiently reliable,” State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 98, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1990) (citations omitted), and that it “can be properly applied to the facts in issue,” State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639 (1995) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). Where no evidence was admitted, and no inquiry conducted, as to the reliability of HGN testing, the Court held that it was error to admit an officer's testimony regarding the results of the HGN test administered on the defendant. Helms, 348 N.C. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295.
After Helms was decided, the North Carolina General Assembly passed House Bill 1048, which added subsection (a1) to Rule 702. 2006 Sess. Laws ch. 253, § 6. Rule 702(a1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a1) A witness, qualified under subsection (a) of this section and with proper foundation, may give expert testimony solely on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific alcohol concentration level relating to the following:
(1) The results of a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) Test when the test is administered by a person who has successfully completed training in HGN.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a1) (2015). The first sentence of this subsection contemplates that testimonial evidence concerning HGN test results be offered by an expert witness. Although the prior version of Rule 702(a) was still in effect when subsection (a1) was added, the bases on which a witness may be qualified as an expert are the same under the current version. Rule 702(a), as amended, provides as follows:
(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a) (2015) (emphasis added); cf. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a) (2009) (“[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.”).
In accordance with Helms, therefore, Rule 702(a1) requires that before a witness can testify as to the results of an HGN test, he must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” See Helms, 348 N.C. at 580–81, 504 S.E.2d at 294–95. If the witness is so qualified and “proper foundation” is established, the witness may “give expert testimony ” as to the HGN test results, subject to the additional limitations in subsection (a1). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a1) (emphasis added). Namely, the expert witness may testify “solely on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific alcohol concentration,” and the HGN test must have been “administered by a person who has successfully completed training in HGN.” Id. (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, although Officer Kennerly completed a training course in DWI detection and standardized field sobriety tests, there was never a formal offer by the State to tender him as an expert witness. In fact, after conducting its own voir dire, the trial court rejected defendant's contention that Officer Kennerly must be qualified as an expert before testifying as to the results of the HGN test:
THE COURT: I will allow this officer to testify that he administered the HGN test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-legged test. He will be allowed to testify as to the indicators of impairment he observed of this defendant in giving these tests. Anything else?
MR. POWERS: I'd ask the Court to note my exception. Is the Court disqualifying him as an expert on the HGN?
THE COURT: I'm not—he doesn't have to be qualified as an expert. I'm not going to make that requirement.
Thereafter, over defendant's objection, Officer Kennerly testified that he “observed four out of six” possible clues during the HGN test, which “indicates a probability that the person could be impaired as a result of the consumption of alcohol.” Furthermore, based on his interactions with defendant and defendant's performance on all of the field sobriety tests, including the HGN test, Officer Kennerly opined that defendant's “mental and physical faculties were appreciably impaired as a result of the consumption of some impairing substance, that substance in this case being alcohol.” Our application of Rule 702(a1) to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the trial court erred in allowing a witness who had not been qualified as an expert under Rule 702(a) to testify as to the issue of impairment based on the HGN test results.
The State, relying on our decision in State v. Smart, 195 N.C.App. 752, 674 S.E.2d 684 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 810, 692 S.E.2d 874 (2010), nevertheless argues for an interpretation of Rule 702(a1) that would not require an arresting officer who administered the HGN test to be qualified as an expert before testifying as to the HGN test results and the issue of impairment related thereto. Unlike this case, however, the arresting officer in Smart was qualified as an expert under Rule 702 before she testified as to her administration of the test. Id . at 755–56, 674 S.E.2d at 685–86. And although the defendant's argument, as it was initially phrased, attacked the officer's qualifications as an expert witness, the defendant's actual challenge went toward the testimony itself: “[The defendant] in fact specifies that his argument pertains to whether the officer's ‘method of proof’—that is, the nystagmus testing—is sufficiently reliable as a basis for expert testimony.” Id. at 755, 674 S.E .2d at 685; see also Goode, 341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640 (“Once the trial court has determined that the method of proof is sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony, the next level of inquiry is whether the witness is qualified as an expert to apply this method to the specific facts of the case.” (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702 (1992)). Addressing this argument, we explained that, at least under the prior version of Rule 702(a), before admitting expert opinion testimony the trial court had to make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is sufficiently valid.” Id. at 756, 674 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Goode, 341 N .C. at 527, 461 S.E.2d at 639); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8–C1, Rule 104(a) (2015) (“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).”). At that time, we interpreted subsection (a1) “as obviating the need for the State to prove that the HGN testing method is sufficiently reliable.” Id. Our holding in Smart went no further, and it has no application here. While some may even question whether Smart survives the amendment to Rule 702(a), that issue is not the one presently before us.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony, we must now determine whether the error was prejudicial so as to warrant a new trial. “In order to establish prejudicial error in the erroneous admission of the HGN evidence, defendant must show only that had the error in question not been committed, a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached at trial.” Helms, 348 N.C. at 583, 504 S.E.2d at 296 (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1443(a) (1997)).
The remaining evidence presented at trial shows the following: (1) Officer Kennerly stopped defendant for speeding; (2) when Officer Kennerly initiated the stop, defendant activated his turn signal, pulled onto the next side street, and came to a stop at roadside in a safe location; (3) defendant was not weaving, and he made no sharp or sudden turns to avoid the traffic stop; (4) two experts testified that they would have expected to see some indicators of impairment which defendant did not exhibit while operating the vehicle; (5) defendant had no problem retrieving his license or registration; (6) defendant did not tilt his head away from Officer Kennerly or otherwise try to avoid contact with him; (7) Officer Kennerly noticed that defendant's eyes were red and glassy, and he smelled a “strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath”; (8) one expert testified that “the odor of alcohol is simply an indicator of presence of alcohol” and that there is “no basis for an opinion that correlates the strength of an odor to blood alcohol concentration in the body”; (9) defendant told Officer Kennerly that he had just left a restaurant where he had consumed three beers that evening; (10) when asked to step out of the vehicle, defendant removed his seatbelt without difficulty, he did not use the doorframe or the vehicle for support while exiting, and he did not stagger or sway once he was out of the vehicle; (11) Officer Kennerly observed six out of eight possible clues during the walk-and-turn test, and two out of four possible clues on the one-leg stand test; (12) defendant repeatedly told Officer Kennerly that he had to use the restroom, and two experts agreed that defendant's need to urinate could have adversely affected his performance on the tests; (13) one of the experts, who reviewed the video from Officer Kennerly's dash camera, testified that Officer Kennerly should not have counted three of the six clues he observed during the walk-and-turn test; that the steep grade of the road where defendant performed the one-leg stand could have adversely affected defendant's performance on the test; and that the presence of traffic on the narrow road where the tests were administered, along with the cold weather that evening, could also have affected defendant's performance on the tests; (14) Helen Godwin, defendant's mother, testified that when she saw defendant at the police station, his eyes were not red or glassy, he did not smell of alcohol, his speech was normal, and she did not believe he was impaired; (15) after being placed under arrest and transported to the Intoximeter site, defendant registered a .08 on the Intoximeter. Based on the foregoing, particularly the conflicting evidence regarding defendant's performance on the other field sobriety tests, we conclude a reasonable possibility exists that, had the HGN test results not been admitted, a different result would have been reached at trial.
B. Jury Instructions
Defendant also contends that trial court erred in denying his request for the following jury instruction concerning the results of the Intoximeter:
A chemical analysis of defendant's breath obtained from an EC/IR–II, which shows an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, is deemed sufficient to prove defendant's alcohol concentration. However, such chemical analysis does not compel you to so find beyond a reasonable doubt. You are still at liberty to consider the credibility and/or to give such chemical analysis when considering whether the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to defendant, the requested instruction was necessary to inform the jury that the Intoximeter results were sufficient to support a finding of impaired driving but did not compel such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. By charging the jury using Pattern Jury Instruction 270. 20A, defendant claims the trial court impressed upon the jury that it could not consider evidence which showed that defendant was not impaired.
“When a defendant requests a special jury instruction, ‘the trial court is not required to give [the] requested instruction in the exact language of the request. However, when the request is correct in law and supported by the evidence in the case, the court must give the instruction in substance.’ “ State v. Beck, 233 N .C.App. 168, 171, 756 S.E.2d 80, 82 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 54, 229 S.E.2d 163, 174 (1976)), writ of supersedeas denied, disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 508, 759 S.E.2d 94 (2014). To establish error, therefore, the defendant “must show that the requested instructions were not given in substance and that substantial evidence supported the omitted instructions.” State v. Garvick, 98 N.C.App. 556, 568, 392 S.E.2d 115, 122 (citing State v. White, 77 N.C.App. 45, 52, 334 S.E.2d 786, 792, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 189, 337 S.E.2d 864 (1985)), aff'd per curiam, 327 N.C. 627, 398 S.E.2d 330 (1990). “The defendant also bears the burden of showing that the jury was misled or misinformed by the instructions given.” Beck, 233 N.C.App. at 171, 756 S.E.2d at 82 (citing State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C.App. 285, 297, 610 S.E.2d 245, 253 (2005)).
As defendant acknowledges in his brief, we have previously rejected his argument concerning Pattern Jury Instruction 270. 20A. In Beck, we concluded that
the trial court's use of the pattern jury instruction [270. 20A] informed the jury that in order to return a verdict of guilty, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's alcohol concentration was .08 or more. This instruction informed the jury, in substance, that it was not compelled to return a guilty verdict based simply on the chemical analysis results showing a .10 alcohol concentration.
Beck, 233 N.C.App. at 171–72, 756 S.E.2d at 83. The trial court also “informed the jury that it possessed the authority to determine the weight of any evidence offered to show that Defendant was—or was not—impaired.” Id. at 172, 756 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted). Despite defendant's attempt to distinguish Beck from the case sub judice, we are unable to do so. Accordingly, we reject defendant's second argument. See In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.”).
III. Conclusion
Although the trial court's jury instructions were proper, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony regarding the HGN test results and the issue of defendant's impairment related thereto, without requiring him to be qualified as an expert under Rule 702(a). Based on the remaining evidence presented at trial, we further conclude a reasonable possibility exists that, had the error not occurred, the jury would have reached a different result. Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
NEW TRIAL.
ELMORE, Judge.
Judges STROUD and DIETZ concur.
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Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

STATE of North Carolina v. William Edward GODWIN, III, Defendant.

No. COA15–766.

    Decided: April 19, 2016

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Teresa L. Townsend, for the State. Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse Jr., for defendant. Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 November 2013 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2016. Mecklenburg County, No. 11 CRS 202887.
William Edward Godwin, III (defendant), appeals his conviction for driving while impaired following a jury trial in superior court. The question for decision is whether Rule 702(a1) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence requires a witness to be qualified as an expert before he may testify to the issue of impairment related to HGN test results. We hold that it does.
I. Background
The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 18 January 2011, at approximately 10:14 p.m., Daniel Kennerly, an officer with the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department, observed defendant driving fourteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit and executed a traffic stop. When he approached the vehicle, Officer Kennerly noticed that defendant's eyes were red and glassy, and he detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant's breath. Officer Kennerly asked defendant where he was coming from and how much alcohol, if any, he had consumed that evening. In response, defendant stated that he had just left a restaurant where he had consumed three beers. Officer Kennerly then asked defendant to step out of his vehicle and began an investigation for impaired driving.
As part of his investigation, Officer Kennerly administered three field sobriety tests: the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand. He observed four out of six possible indicators of impairment during the HGN test, six out of eight possible indicators during the walk-and-turn, and two out of four possible indicators during the one-leg stand. At that time, Officer Kennerly placed defendant under arrest for driving while impaired and transported him to the Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office's Intoximeter site to perform a EC/IR II breath test. The results of the Intoximeter showed that defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was .08.
On 20 December 2011, defendant was convicted in Mecklenburg County District Court of driving while impaired. He appealed to superior court, and the matter came to trial at the 12 November 2013 Criminal Session of the Superior Court for Mecklenburg County. At trial, defendant objected to Officer Kennerly's HGN testimony, arguing that the officer had to be qualified as an expert under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence before such testimony could be admitted. Over defendant's objections, the trial court allowed Officer Kennerly to testify, based on his training and experience, as to his administration of the HGN test, the indicators of impairment, and his opinion regarding defendant's impairment based on the indicators which he observed. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of driving while impaired. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
II. Discussion
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony regarding the HGN test results. Specifically, defendant maintains that Rule 702(a1) requires a party offering testimony about the results of an HGN test to do so through a properly qualified witness who has been accepted as an expert by the trial court. Defendant contends, therefore, that in overruling his objection and allowing Officer Kennerly to offer such testimony as a lay witness, the trial court acted under a misapprehension of the law.
“Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C.App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010) (citing Moody v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 191 N.C.App. 256, 264, 664 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2008)). “ ‘Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of HGN evidence in State v. Helms, 348 N.C. 578, 580, 504 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1998). On discretionary review, the Court agreed with our conclusion that “the HGN test does not measure behavior a lay person would commonly associate with intoxication, but rather represents specialized knowledge that must be presented to the jury by a qualified expert.” Id. at 581, 504 S.E.2d at 295 (emphasis added); see also State v. Helms, 127 N.C.App. 375, 379, 490 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1997) (“[The HGN test] is based upon a scientific principle that the extent and manner in which one's eye quivers can be a reliable measure of the amount of alcohol one has consumed.” (citation omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 348 N.C. 578, 504 S.E.2d 293. This meant that under the prior version of Rule 702, the State had to show, inter alia, that the methodology underlying the test was “sufficiently reliable,” State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 98, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1990) (citations omitted), and that it “can be properly applied to the facts in issue,” State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639 (1995) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). Where no evidence was admitted, and no inquiry conducted, as to the reliability of HGN testing, the Court held that it was error to admit an officer's testimony regarding the results of the HGN test administered on the defendant. Helms, 348 N.C. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295.
After Helms was decided, the North Carolina General Assembly passed House Bill 1048, which added subsection (a1) to Rule 702. 2006 Sess. Laws ch. 253, § 6. Rule 702(a1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a1) A witness, qualified under subsection (a) of this section and with proper foundation, may give expert testimony solely on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific alcohol concentration level relating to the following:
(1) The results of a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) Test when the test is administered by a person who has successfully completed training in HGN.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a1) (2015). The first sentence of this subsection contemplates that testimonial evidence concerning HGN test results be offered by an expert witness. Although the prior version of Rule 702(a) was still in effect when subsection (a1) was added, the bases on which a witness may be qualified as an expert are the same under the current version. Rule 702(a), as amended, provides as follows:
(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a) (2015) (emphasis added); cf. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a) (2009) (“[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.”).
In accordance with Helms, therefore, Rule 702(a1) requires that before a witness can testify as to the results of an HGN test, he must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” See Helms, 348 N.C. at 580–81, 504 S.E.2d at 294–95. If the witness is so qualified and “proper foundation” is established, the witness may “give expert testimony ” as to the HGN test results, subject to the additional limitations in subsection (a1). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a1) (emphasis added). Namely, the expert witness may testify “solely on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific alcohol concentration,” and the HGN test must have been “administered by a person who has successfully completed training in HGN.” Id. (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, although Officer Kennerly completed a training course in DWI detection and standardized field sobriety tests, there was never a formal offer by the State to tender him as an expert witness. In fact, after conducting its own voir dire, the trial court rejected defendant's contention that Officer Kennerly must be qualified as an expert before testifying as to the results of the HGN test:
THE COURT: I will allow this officer to testify that he administered the HGN test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-legged test. He will be allowed to testify as to the indicators of impairment he observed of this defendant in giving these tests. Anything else?
MR. POWERS: I'd ask the Court to note my exception. Is the Court disqualifying him as an expert on the HGN?
THE COURT: I'm not—he doesn't have to be qualified as an expert. I'm not going to make that requirement.
Thereafter, over defendant's objection, Officer Kennerly testified that he “observed four out of six” possible clues during the HGN test, which “indicates a probability that the person could be impaired as a result of the consumption of alcohol.” Furthermore, based on his interactions with defendant and defendant's performance on all of the field sobriety tests, including the HGN test, Officer Kennerly opined that defendant's “mental and physical faculties were appreciably impaired as a result of the consumption of some impairing substance, that substance in this case being alcohol.” Our application of Rule 702(a1) to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the trial court erred in allowing a witness who had not been qualified as an expert under Rule 702(a) to testify as to the issue of impairment based on the HGN test results.
The State, relying on our decision in State v. Smart, 195 N.C.App. 752, 674 S.E.2d 684 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 810, 692 S.E.2d 874 (2010), nevertheless argues for an interpretation of Rule 702(a1) that would not require an arresting officer who administered the HGN test to be qualified as an expert before testifying as to the HGN test results and the issue of impairment related thereto. Unlike this case, however, the arresting officer in Smart was qualified as an expert under Rule 702 before she testified as to her administration of the test. Id . at 755–56, 674 S.E.2d at 685–86. And although the defendant's argument, as it was initially phrased, attacked the officer's qualifications as an expert witness, the defendant's actual challenge went toward the testimony itself: “[The defendant] in fact specifies that his argument pertains to whether the officer's ‘method of proof’—that is, the nystagmus testing—is sufficiently reliable as a basis for expert testimony.” Id. at 755, 674 S.E .2d at 685; see also Goode, 341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640 (“Once the trial court has determined that the method of proof is sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony, the next level of inquiry is whether the witness ․ is qualified as an expert to apply this method to the specific facts of the case.” (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702 (1992)). Addressing this argument, we explained that, at least under the prior version of Rule 702(a), before admitting expert opinion testimony the trial court had to make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is sufficiently valid.” Id. at 756, 674 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Goode, 341 N .C. at 527, 461 S.E.2d at 639); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8–C1, Rule 104(a) (2015) (“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ․ or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).”). At that time, we interpreted subsection (a1) “as obviating the need for the State to prove that the HGN testing method is sufficiently reliable.” Id. Our holding in Smart went no further, and it has no application here. While some may even question whether Smart survives the amendment to Rule 702(a), that issue is not the one presently before us.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony, we must now determine whether the error was prejudicial so as to warrant a new trial. “In order to establish prejudicial error in the erroneous admission of the HGN evidence, defendant must show only that had the error in question not been committed, a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached at trial.” Helms, 348 N.C. at 583, 504 S.E.2d at 296 (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1443(a) (1997)).
The remaining evidence presented at trial shows the following: (1) Officer Kennerly stopped defendant for speeding; (2) when Officer Kennerly initiated the stop, defendant activated his turn signal, pulled onto the next side street, and came to a stop at roadside in a safe location; (3) defendant was not weaving, and he made no sharp or sudden turns to avoid the traffic stop; (4) two experts testified that they would have expected to see some indicators of impairment which defendant did not exhibit while operating the vehicle; (5) defendant had no problem retrieving his license or registration; (6) defendant did not tilt his head away from Officer Kennerly or otherwise try to avoid contact with him; (7) Officer Kennerly noticed that defendant's eyes were red and glassy, and he smelled a “strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath”; (8) one expert testified that “the odor of alcohol is simply an indicator of presence of alcohol” and that there is “no basis for an opinion that correlates the strength of an odor to ․ blood alcohol concentration in the body”; (9) defendant told Officer Kennerly that he had just left a restaurant where he had consumed three beers that evening; (10) when asked to step out of the vehicle, defendant removed his seatbelt without difficulty, he did not use the doorframe or the vehicle for support while exiting, and he did not stagger or sway once he was out of the vehicle; (11) Officer Kennerly observed six out of eight possible clues during the walk-and-turn test, and two out of four possible clues on the one-leg stand test; (12) defendant repeatedly told Officer Kennerly that he had to use the restroom, and two experts agreed that defendant's need to urinate could have adversely affected his performance on the tests; (13) one of the experts, who reviewed the video from Officer Kennerly's dash camera, testified that Officer Kennerly should not have counted three of the six clues he observed during the walk-and-turn test; that the steep grade of the road where defendant performed the one-leg stand could have adversely affected defendant's performance on the test; and that the presence of traffic on the narrow road where the tests were administered, along with the cold weather that evening, could also have affected defendant's performance on the tests; (14) Helen Godwin, defendant's mother, testified that when she saw defendant at the police station, his eyes were not red or glassy, he did not smell of alcohol, his speech was normal, and she did not believe he was impaired; (15) after being placed under arrest and transported to the Intoximeter site, defendant registered a .08 on the Intoximeter. Based on the foregoing, particularly the conflicting evidence regarding defendant's performance on the other field sobriety tests, we conclude a reasonable possibility exists that, had the HGN test results not been admitted, a different result would have been reached at trial.
B. Jury Instructions
Defendant also contends that trial court erred in denying his request for the following jury instruction concerning the results of the Intoximeter:
A chemical analysis of defendant's breath obtained from an EC/IR–II, which shows an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, is deemed sufficient to prove defendant's alcohol concentration. However, such chemical analysis does not compel you to so find beyond a reasonable doubt. You are still at liberty to consider the credibility and/or to give such chemical analysis when considering whether the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to defendant, the requested instruction was necessary to inform the jury that the Intoximeter results were sufficient to support a finding of impaired driving but did not compel such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. By charging the jury using Pattern Jury Instruction 270. 20A, defendant claims the trial court impressed upon the jury that it could not consider evidence which showed that defendant was not impaired.
“When a defendant requests a special jury instruction, ‘the trial court is not required to give [the] requested instruction in the exact language of the request. However, when the request is correct in law and supported by the evidence in the case, the court must give the instruction in substance.’ “ State v. Beck, 233 N .C.App. 168, 171, 756 S.E.2d 80, 82 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 54, 229 S.E.2d 163, 174 (1976)), writ of supersedeas denied, disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 508, 759 S.E.2d 94 (2014). To establish error, therefore, the defendant “must show that the requested instructions were not given in substance and that substantial evidence supported the omitted instructions.” State v. Garvick, 98 N.C.App. 556, 568, 392 S.E.2d 115, 122 (citing State v. White, 77 N.C.App. 45, 52, 334 S.E.2d 786, 792, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 189, 337 S.E.2d 864 (1985)), aff'd per curiam, 327 N.C. 627, 398 S.E.2d 330 (1990). “The defendant also bears the burden of showing that the jury was misled or misinformed by the instructions given.” Beck, 233 N.C.App. at 171, 756 S.E.2d at 82 (citing State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C.App. 285, 297, 610 S.E.2d 245, 253 (2005)).
As defendant acknowledges in his brief, we have previously rejected his argument concerning Pattern Jury Instruction 270. 20A. In Beck, we concluded that
the trial court's use of the pattern jury instruction [270. 20A] informed the jury that in order to return a verdict of guilty, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's alcohol concentration was .08 or more. This instruction informed the jury, in substance, that it was not compelled to return a guilty verdict based simply on the chemical analysis results showing a .10 alcohol concentration.
Beck, 233 N.C.App. at 171–72, 756 S.E.2d at 83. The trial court also “informed the jury that it possessed the authority to determine the weight of any evidence offered to show that Defendant was—or was not—impaired.” Id. at 172, 756 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted). Despite defendant's attempt to distinguish Beck from the case sub judice, we are unable to do so. Accordingly, we reject defendant's second argument. See In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.”).
III. Conclusion
Although the trial court's jury instructions were proper, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony regarding the HGN test results and the issue of defendant's impairment related thereto, without requiring him to be qualified as an expert under Rule 702(a). Based on the remaining evidence presented at trial, we further conclude a reasonable possibility exists that, had the error not occurred, the jury would have reached a different result. Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
NEW TRIAL.
ELMORE, Judge.
Judges STROUD and DIETZ concur.
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Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

STATE of North Carolina v. William Edward GODWIN, III, Defendant.

No. COA15–766.

    Decided: April 19, 2016

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Teresa L. Townsend, for the State. Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse Jr., for defendant. Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 15 November 2013 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2016. Mecklenburg County, No. 11 CRS 202887.
William Edward Godwin, III (defendant), appeals his conviction for driving while impaired following a jury trial in superior court. The question for decision is whether Rule 702(a1) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence requires a witness to be qualified as an expert before he may testify to the issue of impairment related to HGN test results. We hold that it does.
I. Background
The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 18 January 2011, at approximately 10:14 p.m., Daniel Kennerly, an officer with the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department, observed defendant driving fourteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit and executed a traffic stop. When he approached the vehicle, Officer Kennerly noticed that defendant's eyes were red and glassy, and he detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant's breath. Officer Kennerly asked defendant where he was coming from and how much alcohol, if any, he had consumed that evening. In response, defendant stated that he had just left a restaurant where he had consumed three beers. Officer Kennerly then asked defendant to step out of his vehicle and began an investigation for impaired driving.
As part of his investigation, Officer Kennerly administered three field sobriety tests: the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand. He observed four out of six possible indicators of impairment during the HGN test, six out of eight possible indicators during the walk-and-turn, and two out of four possible indicators during the one-leg stand. At that time, Officer Kennerly placed defendant under arrest for driving while impaired and transported him to the Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office's Intoximeter site to perform a EC/IR II breath test. The results of the Intoximeter showed that defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was .08.
On 20 December 2011, defendant was convicted in Mecklenburg County District Court of driving while impaired. He appealed to superior court, and the matter came to trial at the 12 November 2013 Criminal Session of the Superior Court for Mecklenburg County. At trial, defendant objected to Officer Kennerly's HGN testimony, arguing that the officer had to be qualified as an expert under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence before such testimony could be admitted. Over defendant's objections, the trial court allowed Officer Kennerly to testify, based on his training and experience, as to his administration of the HGN test, the indicators of impairment, and his opinion regarding defendant's impairment based on the indicators which he observed. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of driving while impaired. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
II. Discussion
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony regarding the HGN test results. Specifically, defendant maintains that Rule 702(a1) requires a party offering testimony about the results of an HGN test to do so through a properly qualified witness who has been accepted as an expert by the trial court. Defendant contends, therefore, that in overruling his objection and allowing Officer Kennerly to offer such testimony as a lay witness, the trial court acted under a misapprehension of the law.
“Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C.App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010) (citing Moody v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 191 N.C.App. 256, 264, 664 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2008)). “ ‘Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of HGN evidence in State v. Helms, 348 N.C. 578, 580, 504 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1998). On discretionary review, the Court agreed with our conclusion that “the HGN test does not measure behavior a lay person would commonly associate with intoxication, but rather represents specialized knowledge that must be presented to the jury by a qualified expert.” Id. at 581, 504 S.E.2d at 295 (emphasis added); see also State v. Helms, 127 N.C.App. 375, 379, 490 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1997) (“[The HGN test] is based upon a scientific principle that the extent and manner in which one's eye quivers can be a reliable measure of the amount of alcohol one has consumed.” (citation omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 348 N.C. 578, 504 S.E.2d 293. This meant that under the prior version of Rule 702, the State had to show, inter alia, that the methodology underlying the test was “sufficiently reliable,” State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 98, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1990) (citations omitted), and that it “can be properly applied to the facts in issue,” State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639 (1995) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). Where no evidence was admitted, and no inquiry conducted, as to the reliability of HGN testing, the Court held that it was error to admit an officer's testimony regarding the results of the HGN test administered on the defendant. Helms, 348 N.C. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295.
After Helms was decided, the North Carolina General Assembly passed House Bill 1048, which added subsection (a1) to Rule 702. 2006 Sess. Laws ch. 253, § 6. Rule 702(a1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a1) A witness, qualified under subsection (a) of this section and with proper foundation, may give expert testimony solely on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific alcohol concentration level relating to the following:
(1) The results of a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) Test when the test is administered by a person who has successfully completed training in HGN.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a1) (2015). The first sentence of this subsection contemplates that testimonial evidence concerning HGN test results be offered by an expert witness. Although the prior version of Rule 702(a) was still in effect when subsection (a1) was added, the bases on which a witness may be qualified as an expert are the same under the current version. Rule 702(a), as amended, provides as follows:
(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a) (2015) (emphasis added); cf. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a) (2009) (“[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.”).
In accordance with Helms, therefore, Rule 702(a1) requires that before a witness can testify as to the results of an HGN test, he must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” See Helms, 348 N.C. at 580–81, 504 S.E.2d at 294–95. If the witness is so qualified and “proper foundation” is established, the witness may “give expert testimony ” as to the HGN test results, subject to the additional limitations in subsection (a1). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702(a1) (emphasis added). Namely, the expert witness may testify “solely on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific alcohol concentration,” and the HGN test must have been “administered by a person who has successfully completed training in HGN.” Id. (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, although Officer Kennerly completed a training course in DWI detection and standardized field sobriety tests, there was never a formal offer by the State to tender him as an expert witness. In fact, after conducting its own voir dire, the trial court rejected defendant's contention that Officer Kennerly must be qualified as an expert before testifying as to the results of the HGN test:
THE COURT: I will allow this officer to testify that he administered the HGN test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-legged test. He will be allowed to testify as to the indicators of impairment he observed of this defendant in giving these tests. Anything else?
MR. POWERS: I'd ask the Court to note my exception. Is the Court disqualifying him as an expert on the HGN?
THE COURT: I'm not—he doesn't have to be qualified as an expert. I'm not going to make that requirement.
Thereafter, over defendant's objection, Officer Kennerly testified that he “observed four out of six” possible clues during the HGN test, which “indicates a probability that the person could be impaired as a result of the consumption of alcohol.” Furthermore, based on his interactions with defendant and defendant's performance on all of the field sobriety tests, including the HGN test, Officer Kennerly opined that defendant's “mental and physical faculties were appreciably impaired as a result of the consumption of some impairing substance, that substance in this case being alcohol.” Our application of Rule 702(a1) to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the trial court erred in allowing a witness who had not been qualified as an expert under Rule 702(a) to testify as to the issue of impairment based on the HGN test results.
The State, relying on our decision in State v. Smart, 195 N.C.App. 752, 674 S.E.2d 684 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 810, 692 S.E.2d 874 (2010), nevertheless argues for an interpretation of Rule 702(a1) that would not require an arresting officer who administered the HGN test to be qualified as an expert before testifying as to the HGN test results and the issue of impairment related thereto. Unlike this case, however, the arresting officer in Smart was qualified as an expert under Rule 702 before she testified as to her administration of the test. Id . at 755–56, 674 S.E.2d at 685–86. And although the defendant's argument, as it was initially phrased, attacked the officer's qualifications as an expert witness, the defendant's actual challenge went toward the testimony itself: “[The defendant] in fact specifies that his argument pertains to whether the officer's ‘method of proof’—that is, the nystagmus testing—is sufficiently reliable as a basis for expert testimony.” Id. at 755, 674 S.E .2d at 685; see also Goode, 341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640 (“Once the trial court has determined that the method of proof is sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony, the next level of inquiry is whether the witness ․ is qualified as an expert to apply this method to the specific facts of the case.” (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702 (1992)). Addressing this argument, we explained that, at least under the prior version of Rule 702(a), before admitting expert opinion testimony the trial court had to make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is sufficiently valid.” Id. at 756, 674 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Goode, 341 N .C. at 527, 461 S.E.2d at 639); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8–C1, Rule 104(a) (2015) (“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ․ or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).”). At that time, we interpreted subsection (a1) “as obviating the need for the State to prove that the HGN testing method is sufficiently reliable.” Id. Our holding in Smart went no further, and it has no application here. While some may even question whether Smart survives the amendment to Rule 702(a), that issue is not the one presently before us.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony, we must now determine whether the error was prejudicial so as to warrant a new trial. “In order to establish prejudicial error in the erroneous admission of the HGN evidence, defendant must show only that had the error in question not been committed, a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached at trial.” Helms, 348 N.C. at 583, 504 S.E.2d at 296 (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1443(a) (1997)).
The remaining evidence presented at trial shows the following: (1) Officer Kennerly stopped defendant for speeding; (2) when Officer Kennerly initiated the stop, defendant activated his turn signal, pulled onto the next side street, and came to a stop at roadside in a safe location; (3) defendant was not weaving, and he made no sharp or sudden turns to avoid the traffic stop; (4) two experts testified that they would have expected to see some indicators of impairment which defendant did not exhibit while operating the vehicle; (5) defendant had no problem retrieving his license or registration; (6) defendant did not tilt his head away from Officer Kennerly or otherwise try to avoid contact with him; (7) Officer Kennerly noticed that defendant's eyes were red and glassy, and he smelled a “strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath”; (8) one expert testified that “the odor of alcohol is simply an indicator of presence of alcohol” and that there is “no basis for an opinion that correlates the strength of an odor to ․ blood alcohol concentration in the body”; (9) defendant told Officer Kennerly that he had just left a restaurant where he had consumed three beers that evening; (10) when asked to step out of the vehicle, defendant removed his seatbelt without difficulty, he did not use the doorframe or the vehicle for support while exiting, and he did not stagger or sway once he was out of the vehicle; (11) Officer Kennerly observed six out of eight possible clues during the walk-and-turn test, and two out of four possible clues on the one-leg stand test; (12) defendant repeatedly told Officer Kennerly that he had to use the restroom, and two experts agreed that defendant's need to urinate could have adversely affected his performance on the tests; (13) one of the experts, who reviewed the video from Officer Kennerly's dash camera, testified that Officer Kennerly should not have counted three of the six clues he observed during the walk-and-turn test; that the steep grade of the road where defendant performed the one-leg stand could have adversely affected defendant's performance on the test; and that the presence of traffic on the narrow road where the tests were administered, along with the cold weather that evening, could also have affected defendant's performance on the tests; (14) Helen Godwin, defendant's mother, testified that when she saw defendant at the police station, his eyes were not red or glassy, he did not smell of alcohol, his speech was normal, and she did not believe he was impaired; (15) after being placed under arrest and transported to the Intoximeter site, defendant registered a .08 on the Intoximeter. Based on the foregoing, particularly the conflicting evidence regarding defendant's performance on the other field sobriety tests, we conclude a reasonable possibility exists that, had the HGN test results not been admitted, a different result would have been reached at trial.
B. Jury Instructions
Defendant also contends that trial court erred in denying his request for the following jury instruction concerning the results of the Intoximeter:
A chemical analysis of defendant's breath obtained from an EC/IR–II, which shows an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, is deemed sufficient to prove defendant's alcohol concentration. However, such chemical analysis does not compel you to so find beyond a reasonable doubt. You are still at liberty to consider the credibility and/or to give such chemical analysis when considering whether the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to defendant, the requested instruction was necessary to inform the jury that the Intoximeter results were sufficient to support a finding of impaired driving but did not compel such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. By charging the jury using Pattern Jury Instruction 270. 20A, defendant claims the trial court impressed upon the jury that it could not consider evidence which showed that defendant was not impaired.
“When a defendant requests a special jury instruction, ‘the trial court is not required to give [the] requested instruction in the exact language of the request. However, when the request is correct in law and supported by the evidence in the case, the court must give the instruction in substance.’ “ State v. Beck, 233 N .C.App. 168, 171, 756 S.E.2d 80, 82 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 54, 229 S.E.2d 163, 174 (1976)), writ of supersedeas denied, disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 508, 759 S.E.2d 94 (2014). To establish error, therefore, the defendant “must show that the requested instructions were not given in substance and that substantial evidence supported the omitted instructions.” State v. Garvick, 98 N.C.App. 556, 568, 392 S.E.2d 115, 122 (citing State v. White, 77 N.C.App. 45, 52, 334 S.E.2d 786, 792, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 189, 337 S.E.2d 864 (1985)), aff'd per curiam, 327 N.C. 627, 398 S.E.2d 330 (1990). “The defendant also bears the burden of showing that the jury was misled or misinformed by the instructions given.” Beck, 233 N.C.App. at 171, 756 S.E.2d at 82 (citing State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C.App. 285, 297, 610 S.E.2d 245, 253 (2005)).
As defendant acknowledges in his brief, we have previously rejected his argument concerning Pattern Jury Instruction 270. 20A. In Beck, we concluded that
the trial court's use of the pattern jury instruction [270. 20A] informed the jury that in order to return a verdict of guilty, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's alcohol concentration was .08 or more. This instruction informed the jury, in substance, that it was not compelled to return a guilty verdict based simply on the chemical analysis results showing a .10 alcohol concentration.
Beck, 233 N.C.App. at 171–72, 756 S.E.2d at 83. The trial court also “informed the jury that it possessed the authority to determine the weight of any evidence offered to show that Defendant was—or was not—impaired.” Id. at 172, 756 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted). Despite defendant's attempt to distinguish Beck from the case sub judice, we are unable to do so. Accordingly, we reject defendant's second argument. See In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.”).
III. Conclusion
Although the trial court's jury instructions were proper, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Kennerly's testimony regarding the HGN test results and the issue of defendant's impairment related thereto, without requiring him to be qualified as an expert under Rule 702(a). Based on the remaining evidence presented at trial, we further conclude a reasonable possibility exists that, had the error not occurred, the jury would have reached a different result. Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
NEW TRIAL.
ELMORE, Judge.
Judges STROUD and DIETZ concur.
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